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Khuram Iqbal: The Co-author of “Paki-
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PhD candidate and researcher at the Centre for 
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the UK House of Lords.
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at Stanford Law School.  His interests focus on 
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ly interested in issues related to national defense, 
counterterrorism, and non-proliferation.  Avi is a 
J.D. Candidate at Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter.  
Tom Smith is a PhD candidate at the Uni-
versity of Hull where he is completing a thesis in 
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holds the post of Visiting Lecturer at De La Salle 
University in Manila. He is the Editor-in-Chief of 
The Journal of International Relations Research.
Monitor, the World Politics Review, The Pioneer, 
and Open Democracy, and by the UK’s Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the As-
sociated Press, among others.
 Neil received his degree from the George 
Washington University’s Elliott School of Inter-
national Affairs, and studied management at the 
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Frederick S. Schultz, a white collar 
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Defense and Strategic Studies program. Mr. 
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Laude from Duke University where he was a 
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national Relations at the University of Cambridge, 
where his research focuses on government and 
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North Waziristan 
The Ground Realities 
By Sabina Khan
Introduction
 The successful May 1, 2011 raid on Osama 
Bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad has em-
boldened the United States to intensify pressure 
on Pakistan to conduct operations in the tribal 
agency of North Waziristan. The purpose of such 
an operation would be to target the Haqqani net-
work of the Afghan Taliban.1 With the NATO/Inter-
national Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with-
drawal deadline approaching, lack of operations in 
North Waziristan is being framed as the source of 
continued resistance in Afghanistan.
  After the US invasion of Afghanistan, 
the war on terror surged into the urban areas of 
Pakistan. Over 30,000 civilians and 3,500 military 
personnel have perished thus far as a result of 
terrorist violence in the country.2 Extended con-
flict and massive natural disasters have yielded the 
highest internal refugee population in the world.3 
Year-round rolling blackouts and incessant drone 
strikes within Pakistan’s borders further amplify 
1.  Barbara Starr, “US targeting Haqqani network in Pakistan,” 
CNN, September 21, 2011, <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/21/us-
targeting-haqqani-network-in-pakistan/>.
2.  John Bingham, “Bin Laden: 3,519 days, 2 wars, $1.283 trillion, 
Tens of  Thousands of  Lives,” The Telegraph, May 13, 2011, <http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8488157/Bin-Laden-
3519-days-2-wars-1.283-trillion-tens-of-thousands-of-lives.html>.
3.  2012 U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees Country Operations 
Profile, UNHCR, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487016.html>.
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tensions and have left the weak government of 
Pakistan struggling to maintain control.  The acci-
dental killing of 24 Pakistani troops by NATO was 
the latest test of Pakistani government’s resolve.4 
The Pakistan military has conducted operations 
in six of the seven agencies with the exception of 
North Waziristan. Military operations in this agen-
cy remain a contentious subject between the two 
allies. Pakistan has stated that it does not have the 
means to open up another front and must focus on 
militant groups which carry out terrorist attacks 
within the country. Meanwhile the US asserts that 
Pakistan is providing sanctuary to the Haqqani 
network in order to gain a controlling influence in 
Afghanistan once coalition forces withdraw.5
 This paper examines the possibility of 
conducting military operations in North Waziristan 
along with the complexities and intricacies in-
volved. The US, India, and Afghanistan have vested 
interests in the future of the region. Their roles 
will also be discussed at length in order to shed 
greater light on the subject.
North Waziristan
 
 The Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) of Pakistan are located in a narrow belt 
which runs along the Pakistan/Afghanistan bor-
der also known as the Durand Line. Nearly 1,500 
miles of unforgiving, harsh mountainous terrain 
4  “Pakistan buries 24 troops killed in NATO airstrike,” BBC, No-
vember 27, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15908760>.
5  Rob Crilly, “Pakistan using Haqqani network to wage ‘proxy 
war’ in Afghanistan”, The Telegraph. September 21, 2011, <http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8779093/Pakistan-using-
Haqqani-network-to-wage-proxy-war-in-Afghanistan.html>. 
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 In response, the Pakistan government 
stated that the peace accord was signed with 
tribal elders and not with the Taliban.10 In 2008, 
the peace agreement was revived and the tribes of 
North Waziristan agreed to jointly struggle against 
terrorism and extremism in the agency. However, 
the use of drone strikes by the United States and 
recent attack on Pakistani checkpoints by militants 
in North Waziristan threaten the peace deal.11
Militant Groups in 
North Waziristan 
 
 North Waziristan hosts a web of militant 
groups and tribes including the Afghan Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda. Their hideouts are located in the 
mountains between Miramshah, North Waziristan’s 
capital, and the Afghan border. Media sources esti-
mate that several hundred foreign al-Qaeda fight-
ers reside in the North Waziristan, mostly from 
Arab countries and Uzbekistan, as well as a few 
Africans, Chechens and Westerners.12 The Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad 
Union (IJU) are two particular Uzbek factions 
residing in North Waziristan. Both organizations 
are beginning to extend deeper into the country 
and have ties to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 
al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network.13 
10  “Convoy ambush toll rises to 27: Taliban scraps North Wa-
ziristan peace deal”, Dawn News, June 30, 2009, < http://archives.dawn.
com/archives/41619.
11  Manzoor Ali, “North Waziristan: Haqqani aide threatens to scrap 
peace deal,” The Express Tribune, November 13, 2011, <http://tribune.com.
pk/story/290764/n-waziristan-militant-leader-threatens-government/>. 
12  “Qaeda firmly rooted in Pakistan tribal fiefdom: report”, Agence 
France-Presse, August 26, 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/26/
qaeda-firmly-rooted-in-pakistan-tribal-fiefdom.html>.
13  Jeffrey Dressler, “A Dangerous Mix: Militant groups in North 
Waziristan,” AEI Critical Threats, June 1, 2011, <http://www.criti-
serves as the border between the two countries. 
The tribal areas of Pakistan are mostly populated 
by Pashtuns and consist of seven agencies, Bajaur, 
Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Wa-
ziristan and South Waziristan. 
 North Waziristan is characterized by rugged 
hills with deep gorges and it is mostly impassable. 
Approximately 350,000 people reside there and 
is home to some of the most dangerous militants, 
mainly the Haqqani network.6 
 In 2002, the Pakistani military began com-
bat operations in North Waziristan. However, in 
2006, a peace agreement known as the Waziristan 
Accord was signed to end conflict in the agency.7 
Under the agreement tribal elders pledged not to 
attack state property or security personnel in Paki-
stan. In return, the government of Pakistan prom-
ised not to undertake any ground or air opera-
tions in North Waziristan and to resolve disputes 
through local tribal customs and traditions.8 The 
short lived deal broke down in 2007 after militants 
from Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) burnt down the 
Ministry of Environment and attacked the Army 
Rangers guarding it. This led to a siege of the Lal 
Masjid by the security forces and resulted in the 
deaths of 154 militants. Taliban members subse-
quently retaliated by carrying out violent attacks 
against the Pakistan military.9  
6  Kathy Gannon, “North Waziristan: new epicenter of  terror 
fight,” Associated Press, October 25, 2007, <http://www.navytimes.com/
news/2010/10/ap-pakistan-north-waziristan-new-epicenter-of-terror-
fight-102510/>. 
7  Evagoras C. Leventis, “The Waziristan Accord,” Global Politi-
cian, December 18, 2007, <http://www.globalpolitician.com/23893-paki-
stan>.
8  Ibid. 
9  “Scores killed in Pakistan attacks”, BBC News, July 19, 2007, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6905808.stm>.
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Hafiz Gul Bahudur 
 
 Besides the Haqqanis, Hafiz Gul Bahadur is 
another prominent militant leader in North Wa-
ziristan. He fought in Afghanistan during the civil 
war following the Soviet withdrawal and became 
a political activist in the Islamist party Jamiat 
Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) upon his return to North 
Waziristan. 
 Bahadur has relations with various groups, 
including the Haqqanis in North Waziristan, but 
has been careful to avoid confrontation with 
the Pakistani state. His strategy is similar to the 
Haqqanis’ which focuses more on US and NATO 
troops in Afghanistan.16 However, Bahadur has 
provided anti-Pakistan militants from the southern 
territory a safe haven in North Waziristan since 
June 2009.17 Conversely, the Pakistan military has 
used territory that is under his area of influence 
to launch operations against the Tehrik-e-Taliban 
(TTP).18
TTP (Pakistan Taliban) 
 
 The TTP was set up by Baitullah Mehsud in 
1996 to unleash chaos on Pakistan due to its sup-
port of the US. This group consists of anti-Pakistan 
16  Anand Gopal, and Mansur Khan Mahsud with Brian Fishman, 
“Inside Pakistan’s tribal frontier: North Waziristan,” The AfPak Channel, 
April 23, 2010, <http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/23/inside_
pakistans_tribal_frontier_north_waziristan>.
17  Gopal, “Inside Pakistan’s tribal frontier: North Waziristan,” 
Foreign Policy, April 23, 2010, <http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/
posts/2010/04/23/inside_pakistans_tribal_frontier_north_waziristan>.
18  Reza Jan, “The FATA Conflict After South Waziristan: Pakistan’s 
War Continues Against Militants in Orakzai, Bajaur and North Waziristan,” 
AEI Critical Threats Project, February 22, 2010, <http://www.criti-
calthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_FATA_Con-
flict_After_South_Waziristan.pdf>.
The Haqqani network
 
 The Haqqani network is an al-Qaeda linked 
insurgent group in Afghanistan and Pakistan that 
is closely allied with the Taliban.14 Though the 
Haqqanis claim they no longer need safe havens 
in Pakistan and have shifted to Afghanistan, it 
is believed that they still maintain a presence in 
North Waziristan.15 Many deadly attacks on the US 
led coalition forces in Afghanistan are suspected 
to have Haqqani origins. The aging leader of the 
group, Jalaluddin Haqqani, is a former anti-Soviet 
resistance commander from Afghanistan’s Khost 
Province. Haqqani established a base in Pakistan’s 
tribal areas in the 1970s. He received funding from 
the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Paki-
stan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and Saudi 
Arabia to support resistance to the Soviets. After 
Soviet troops left, Haqqani allied with the Taliban 
during Afghanistan’s civil wars. Haqqani’s son, 
Sirajuddin has taken over operational command 
and is focusing on driving out US and Afghan 
government forces from Afghanistan. The network 
is active in Afghanistan’s southeastern areas of 
Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Logar, and Ghazni Province. 
calthreats.org/pakistan/dangerous-mix-militant-groups-north-waziristan-
june-1-2011>.
14  Anand Gopal, “The most deadly US foe in Afghanistan”, Chris-
tian Science Monitor, May 31, 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Asia-South-Central/2009/0601/p10s01-wosc.html>.
15  “‘No sanctuaries in Pakistan’: Haqqani network shifts base to 
Afghanistan”, The Express Tribune, September 18, 2011, <http://tribune.
com.pk/story/254368/no-haqqani-network-sanctuaries-in-pakistan-sirajud-
din/>.
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the “epicenter of terrorism.”23 President Obama 
publicly claims North Waziristan is key to winning 
the Afghan war.24 Although they maintain a work-
ing relationship, the US and Pakistan have dif-
ferent strategic interests in North Waziristan. The 
Pakistan military is concerned, first and foremost, 
with the militant hubs that are used to launch 
attacks within Pakistan. The US, on the other 
hand, is concerned about militants that cross into 
Afghanistan and target coalition forces. The US 
criticizes Pakistan’s inaction in North Waziristan. 
Pakistan retorts that it does not have the resources 
to open another front. 
 Condemning Pakistan’s failure to act in 
North Waziristan, the US is pursuing an intense 
drone strike campaign in North Waziristan to kill 
and disrupt Al Qaeda, Taliban and other militants 
operating in the area. Nearly 300 drone strikes 
have been launched since 2004. There were 118 
strikes in 2010 alone.25 Leadership of Al Qaeda has 
been reportedly disrupted as a result. However, 
these drone strikes violate Pakistan’s sovereignty 
and produce collateral damage which has a nega-
tive impact on the US image in Pakistan. Accord-
ing to a report by the Bureau of Investigative Jour-
nalism, a non-profit organization based in London, 
a drone strike occurs every four days. The group 
estimates that the drone program has caused at 
least 392 civilian casualties, including 175 children, 
23  Gannon, “New epicenter of  terror fight,” The Washington Post, 
October 12, 2010, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/26/
pakistan-border-region-becomes-terror-epicenter/?page=all>.
24  Ibid.
25  “The year of  the drone”, New America Foundation, 2004-2011, 
<http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones/2011>.
groups operating in Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber, 
Mohmand, Bajaur, Swat and Dir regions.19 After 
the Pakistani army conducted operations in South 
Waziristan targeting TTP’s headquarters in Octo-
ber 2009, the TTP leadership relocated to North 
Waziristan.20 It maintains close ties with various 
other groups including the Haqqani network, al 
Qaeda, and the Punjab based Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. 
 An assortment of other jihadi groups also 
exist in North Waziristan and the situation is 
clearly troublesome as the unity among the mili-
tants is crumbling.21 Those allied with the Haqqani 
network want to concentrate all of their efforts 
on Afghanistan, hence the peace accord with the 
Pakistan army. Meanwhile the Al-Qaeda-linked 
militants, including Punjabis, see the Pakistani 
state as well as the coalition forces across the bor-
der in Afghanistan as enemies.22
United States
 The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 
toppled the Taliban but inadvertently led to a 
surge of militants into Pakistan’s tribal areas. The 
US considers North Waziristan a base for al-Qaeda 
headquarters and the most dangerous place in the 
world. Former US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen called North Waziristan 
19  Chaghai Helmand, “The Afghan-Pakistan militant nexus,” 
BBC, October 6, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-
asia-15149996>.
20  Bill Roggio, “Taliban attack Pakistan Army in North Waziristan,” 
Long War Journal, August 14, 2011 http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-
matrix/archives/2011/08/taliban_attack_pakistani_army.php.
21  Arif  Jamal, “Floods Wash Out Counterterrorist Operations in 
North Waziristan,” Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 8 Issue: 34
22  Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Showdown looms in North Waziristan,” 
Asia Times, April 28, 2010  <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/
LD28Df04.html>.
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since 2004.26 
 The US and Pakistan shared a mutual un-
derstanding of the predator drone program, even 
if it was not acknowledged publicly.27 This relation-
ship came to a sudden halt following the NATO 
attack on two Pakistani checkpoints on November 
26th of 2011. Pakistan reacted by shutting down the 
Shamsi air base which was being used by the CIA 
to conduct drone strikes in the tribal areas.28
In light of the upcoming 2014 deadline for the 
coalition troop withdrawal, the US has reversed 
its Afghan strategy and is now negotiating with 
the Afghan Taliban through third parties. Senator 
John Kerry, Democratic Senator of Massachusetts, 
said in an NPR interview that there is “no military 
solution” for Afghanistan and that “there are very 
active efforts now to seek an appropriate kind of 
political settlement.”29 According to NATO, coali-
tion forces in Afghanistan have been facilitating 
the talks and have provided safe passage for senior 
Taliban leaders to visit Kabul.30 The United States 
held an exploratory meeting with the Haqqani 
network, which was arranged by Pakistan’s intelli-
gence agency, the ISI.31 Thus, contradictory strate-
26  Chris Woods, Covert Drone War, The Bureau of  Investiga-
tive Journalism, August 10, 2011, <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.
com/2011/08/10/most-complete-picture-yet-of-cia-drone-strikes/>.
27  Tim Lister, “WikiLeaks: Pakistan quietly approved drone attacks, 
US special units,” CNN, December 2, 2010, <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/
US/12/01/wikileaks.pakistan.drones/>. 
28  Salman Masood, CIA leaves base in Pakistan used for drone 
strikes, New York Times, December 11, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/12/12/world/asia/cia-leaves-pakistan-base-used-for-drone-
strikes.html>.
29  David Gura, “It’s critical to understand instability risk in 
Pakistan,” NPR, August 20, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2010/08/20/129327894/it-s-critical-to-understand-instability-risk-in-
pakistan-john-kerry-tells-npr>.
30  Adam Entous, “US encourages Afghan led Taliban talks,” Wall 
Street Journal, October 15, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014
24052748704361504575552092245669952.html>.
31  “US meets Haqqani network: Clinton”, Express Tribune, October 
21, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/278892/us-met-haqqani-network-
gies are being pursued.  Pakistan is being asked to 
attack the Haqqanis in North Waziristan and also 
bring them to the negotiating table at the same 
time. 
 Failing to clear the Kunar and Nuristan 
provinces in Afghanistan, US forces withdrew 
from the area as detailed by the New York Times.32 
Numerous insurgent groups remain firmly estab-
lished in these two remote and violent provinces 
which border Pakistan’s tribal areas. These mili-
tants continue to cross into Pakistan and carry 
out attacks.33 Thus, Pakistan had to move troops to 
Chitral, Upper and Lower Dir to combat repeated 
incursions by the Taliban into Pakistani territo-
ry.34 Pakistan has accused ISAF and the Afghan 
National Army (ANA) for allowing these groups to 
thrive in Afghanistan.35 
Pakistan
 Following September 11, 2001, Pakistan de-
ployed the largest number of troops in the world 
to fight the spread of terrorism, 140,000 in total.36 
Compare their commitment to the 140,000 coali-
clinton/>.
32  C.J. Chivers, Alissa J. Rubin, Wesley Morgan, “US pulling back 
in Afghan Valley it called vital to war,” February 24, 2011, New York Times, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/world/asia/25afghanistan.html?_
r=2&pagewanted=all>.
33  “Cross-border attacks: Army, FC sent to areas bordering Af-
ghanistan,” Express Tribune, October 18, 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/
story/276646/cross-border-attack-army-fc-sent-to-areas-bordering-afghani-
stan/>.
34  “Troops deployed along border in Dir, Chitral,” Dawn News, 
September 13, 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/09/13/troops-deployed-
along-border-in-dir-chitral.html>.
35  Bill Roggio, “Taliban kill 25 Pakistani troops in cross-border 
attack,” Long War Journal, August 27, 2011, <http://www.longwarjournal.
org/archives/2011/08/taliban_kill_25_paki.php>.
36  Steve Inskeep, “Pakistan, Militants in Deadly Border Fight,” 
NPR, June 6, 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/06/06/136977007/paki-
stan-militants-in-deadly-border-fight>. 
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scale operation in North Waziristan would also 
jeopardize the military’s clean-up efforts in other 
areas.
 If Pakistani forces do conduct operations 
in North Waziristan then most likely the Afghan 
Haqqani network will not be their target. Paki-
stan is also looking to safeguard its interests once 
NATO leaves Afghanistan. It believes that opera-
tions against the Haqqani network would open 
another front and make enemies out of allies 
which could prove useful in Afghanistan once the 
coalition forces leave. Historic ties exist between 
the ISI and the Haqqani network.
 There are various strategic aspects which 
will determine the future of Pakistan military 
operations in North Waziristan. Amongst the 
main factors preventing Pakistan from conducting 
operations in North Waziristan is its relationship 
with neighboring India and Afghanistan. Conflict 
throughout the area shared by these nations has 
been documented for thousands of years. Bringing 
about significant reform will be a painstaking pro-
cess. Pakistan has cited several reasons for delay-
ing operations in North Waziristan including the 
withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, the 
US peace talks with the Taliban, plus the widening 
influence of India in Afghanistan.
India
 After the fall of the Taliban, India moved 
quickly to establish its influence in Afghanistan. 
The country built consulates in Herat and Mazhar-
e-Sharif and reopened old ones in Kandahar 
tion forces in Afghanistan made up of troops from 
48 countries.37 According to the Pakistan Economic 
Survey 2010-11, the country’s economy has suf-
fered direct and indirect losses of up to $67.93 
billion since 2001 when it became a frontline state 
in the ‘war against terrorism.’38
 There are 34,000 Pakistani troops (six 
brigades) specific to North Waziristan and they 
actively carry out “surgical” raids against militants 
in the agency, comprising of unit level operations. 
Pakistan has not announced a date for a large-scale 
operation as of yet.39 To conduct such an opera-
tion would require several more infantry divisions 
since the terrain is quite harsh and there will be 
immense blow back in the form of political and 
terrorist attacks to deal with.40 
 Pakistan has raised numerous concerns 
about conducting operations in North Waziristan. 
A military entrance into North Waziristan could 
scatter the militants across Pakistan causing even 
further havoc in the country. Pakistan is also sensi-
tive to the threat of a fierce backlash from Pash-
tuns in the tribal belts and accusations of fighting 
America’s war.41 North Waziristan’s terrain will lead 
to heavy causalities of Pakistani troops and a large-
37  “Foreign forces in Afghanistan,” BBC,  July 20, 2011,  <http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11371138>.  
38  “War on Terror cost Pakistan $67.9 billion,> Dawn News, June 
20, 2011, <http://www.dawn.com/2011/06/20/war-on-terror-cost-paki-
stan-679-billion.html>. 
39  Imtiaz Gul, “Is North Waziristan Next?” AfPak Channel, March 
4, 2010, <http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/04/is_north_wa-
ziristan_next>. 
40  Rob Crilly, “Pakistan hits back at American support for India by 
stopping al-Qaeda offensive,” The Telegraph, November 22, 2010, <http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8151875/Pakistan-
hits-back-at-American-support-for-India-by-stopping-al-Qaeda-offensive.
html>.  
41  Kathy Gannon, “Pakistan border region becomes terror 
epicenter,” Washington Times, October 26, 2010, <http://www.washing-
tontimes.com/news/2010/oct/26/pakistan-border-region-becomes-terror-
epicenter/?page=1>. 
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stan quickly in the event of a conflict. This strat-
egy aims to send expeditious groups to deliver a 
limited retaliatory ground strike within a few days 
of suffering a terrorist attack by militants based 
in Pakistan, yet not do enough damage to set off a 
nuclear strike.46 Pakistani officials have told the US 
that worries about Cold Start is the source of their 
refusal to move forces away from the border with 
India so that they can conduct operations near 
Afghanistan.47 Since India’s Cold Start Doctrine is 
Pakistan-specific, planning has gone into defend-
ing against Cold Start implementation, and tactics 
include shifting troops from FATA to the Indian 
border. Meanwhile, others who have reviewed 
the facts do not pay Cold Start the same level of 
seriousness. The former US ambassador to India, 
Timothy Roemer, described India’s strategy as a 
“mixture of myth and reality” and that it is unlikely 
that India would implement it. He added that even 
if the Cold Start strategy was executed its success 
would be “questionable.”48
Afghanistan 
 “Afghanistan has been a prize that Pakistan 
and India have fought over directly and indirectly 
for decades,” wrote analyst Robert Kaplan.49 Dur-
46  Dr Subash Kapila, “India’s new Cold Start doctrine strategically 
reviewed,” South Asia Analysis Group, May 5, 2004,  <http://www.southa-
siaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers10%5Cpaper991.html>.
47  Lydia Polgreen, “Obama Is Not Likely to Push India Hard on 
Pakistan,” New York Times, November 5, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/11/06/world/asia/06india.html>.  
48  US Embassy Cable, “India unlikely to deploy Cold Start against 
Pakistan,” Guardian, November 30, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/us-embassy-cables-documents/248971>. 
49  Jayshree Bajoria, “India-Afghanistan Relations,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, July 22, 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/17474/
indiaafghanistan_relations.html>. 
and Jalalabad which had been closed since 1979. 
India is also one of Kabul’s leading donors and 
has pledged a total of $2 billion for rebuilding 
the infrastructure.42 Funds have been allocated for 
food aid, education, health, power and strengthen-
ing the governance system. Bilateral trade between 
Afghanistan and India has increased. 
 In 2008 President Obama called for a 
comprehensive regional solution linking Kashmir 
to problems on the Af-Pak border. In an interview 
with Time magazine, he stated that resolving the 
Kashmir conflict would be critical for his admin-
istration’s efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.43 
However, when Richard Holbrooke was appointed 
special representative for the region, his brief did 
not include India or Kashmir. The reason for this 
exclusion was India’s intense lobbying in Washing-
ton to leave Kashmir off Holbrooke’s agenda.44   
Kashmir remains the top priority for the Pakistani 
military and complicates the possibility of opera-
tions in North Waziristan. This is one of the key 
issues which is preventing Pakistan from moving 
its forces away from the Indian border. India has 
also been accused of funneling arms and money to 
insurgents into Pakistan’s Baluchistan through the 
Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad.45
India’s Cold Start Doctrine is a plan to deploy 
new ground forces that could strike inside Paki-
42  “Indian PM Manmohan Singh pledges $500m to Afghanistan,” BBC, May 
12, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13370637>. 
43  Joe Klien, “The full Obama Interview,” Time, October 23, 2008, 
<http://swampland.time.com/2008/10/23/the_full_obama_interview/>.
44  Laura Rozen, “India’s stealth lobbying against Holbrooke’s 
brief,” Foreign Policy, January 24, 2009, <http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/
posts/2009/01/23/india_s_stealth_lobbying_against_holbrooke>. 
45  Christine Fair, “What’s the problem with Pakistan,”  Foreign Af-
fairs, March 31, 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/round-
tables/whats-the-problem-with-pakistan>. 
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In 2001, the US offensive in Afghanistan advanced 
from the west towards the east and pushed out the 
Taliban militants into Pakistan. The border is soft 
on accounts of the Durand Line regulated by the 
“easement rights;” which entitles individuals to 
move freely across the border if their tribes have 
been divided.51 Pakistani Pashtuns welcomed the 
Afghan Taliban with open arms because of a com-
mon ethnicity and a history of integration since 
the Soviet occupation. Considering their conflict 
with the Northern Alliance, Pashtuns are inclined 
to negotiate directly with the US and not with the 
Afghanistan government. The US participation in 
these talks actively undermines their own onetime 
goal to have Afghanistan lead the upcoming transi-
tion of power.
 Even if North Waziristan is cleared, coali-
tion difficulties in Afghanistan will not automati-
cally cease to exist. The US withdrew forces from 
Helmand and Kandahar and shifted its presence to 
the eastern provinces bordering North Waziristan. 
Meanwhile the insurgent groups in Nuristan and 
Kunar are thriving since there is no presence of 
coalition troops in those territories.52 These groups 
continue to conduct insurgency in Pakistan.
Conclusion
 The 8,000-feet high mountains in North 
Waziristan possess a myriad of escape routes into 
51  Ahmer Bilal Soofi, “A law for crossing the Durand Line,” The 
News, October 8, 2011, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.
aspx?ID=9412&Cat=13>.
52 C.J. Chivers, Alissa J. Rubin, Wesley Morgan, “US pulling back 
in Afghan Valley it called vital to war,” New York Times, February 24, 
2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/world/asia/25afghanistan.
html?pagewanted=all>.
ing the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, India sup-
ported the Soviet Union and backed the com-
munist regime of President Najibullah, while 
the United States and Pakistan supported the 
Mujahideen with their resistance to the intruders. 
After the defeat of the Soviet Union the Taliban 
took control of Afghanistan, ending a lengthy and 
bloody civil war. When the dust settled India was 
left without any real influence in the country. 
The Taliban regime called itself the Islamic Emir-
ate of Afghanistan and gained diplomatic recogni-
tion from only three states: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates.50 Pakistan had been 
a supporter of the Taliban until President Pervez 
Musharraf agreed to assist US forces in overthrow-
ing the Taliban following the attacks of September 
11, 2001.
 Toppling the former power in Afghanistan 
changed the dynamics of the country. Afghans 
who are in power today are ideologically differ-
ent. They include Shias who are inclined towards 
Iranian influence as well as other minorities from 
the North such as Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. 
The Northern Alliance reached new heights of 
power after the US overthrew the Pashtuns. This 
resulted in a dramatic decline in the representa-
tion of Pashtuns who were unable to join the 
armed forces, government, and law enforcement 
ranks. The Pashtuns represent a cohesive majority 
in Afghanistan and their intentional marginaliza-
tion cannot be sustained in any natural manner. 
50  “Afghanistan Disintegrates: Implications for Counter-Terrorism,” 
Center for Defense Information, September 27, 2010, <http://www.cdi.org/
terrorism/afghanistan-disintegrates-pr.html>.  
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of protecting their side of the border.57 To encour-
age Pakistan to abandon perceived future assets, 
the US must acknowledge that all nations act in 
what they believe to be as their best interest. An 
equal or better incentive must be offered to offset 
the loss of Haqqani protections along their west-
ern border. Pledging billions of dollars in aid has 
already been proven as an inadequate carrot, and 
may even be rejected in the future as a political 
gesture to declare sovereignty from western influ-
ence. One well documented and important issue 
to Pakistan is the disputed territory of Kashmir. 
Perhaps showing an interest in seeking to resolve 
Kashmir would be a step in the right direction. 
This will force the US to decide what is exactly in 
their own best interests since raising the issue will 
undoubtedly cause rifts with another ally, India. 
The US can also influence Pakistan by fulfilling 
the “high-impact, high visibility infrastructure” 
goals of the Kerry Lugar Berman aid package.58 
Despite suffering from two severe floods last year, 
Pakistan is one of the most arid countries in the 
world.59 Accordingly, construction of megadams 
would offer immense benefits such as water storge, 
57  Aryn Baker, “The Unwinnable War,” Time, October 24, 2011, 
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2096817,00.html>.  
58  Office of  the Special Representative for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, “Afghanistan and Pakistan regional stabilization strategy,” US 
Department of  State, February 4, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/135728.pdf>.
59  “Going with the flow,” Economist, February 11, 2012, <http://
www.economist.com/node/21546883?fsrc=scn/tw/te/ar/goingwiththe-
flow>.
Afghanistan. These routes must be addressed in 
order to prevent the militants from fleeing into Af-
ghanistan to avoid defeat. Pakistan has four times 
the number of border posts compared to NATO.53 
Given the number of unequal checkpoints on each 
side of the Durand Line, a permanent push of 
militants outside of North Waziristan is currently 
impossible because Afghanistan will continue to 
provide militants strategic depth for retreat.54 
If military operations are conducted in North 
Waziristan, they will prioritize addressing the 
Pakistani Taliban, which has declared war on the 
government of Pakistan. Instead of a major assault, 
selective operations will be conducted in North 
Waziristan to shrink the space for local facilitators 
of al-Qaeda, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban and Lash-
kar-e-Jhangvi.55 
 Both the US and Pakistan consider Haqqa-
ni an important player in the reconciliation efforts 
in Afghanistan. Pakistan will hold on to the Pash-
tun card (Haqqani) since it believes that Afghani-
stan is destined to break into civil war after the co-
alition forces withdraw in 2014.56 The US efforts to 
train and empower the Afghan National Army have 
not been promising thus far. The Afghan forces 
continue to suffer from deserters and infiltrators, 
and Pakistan does not believe they will be capable 
53  Lyse Doucet, “Nato urged ‘to do more’ on Afghan-Pakistan 
border,” BBC, August 6, 2010,  <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-
asia-10891034>. 
54  Sherry Rehman, “North Waziristan is the Final Frontier,” 
Times of  India, June 13, 2010, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/
sunday-toi/all-that-matters/North-Waziristan-is-the-final-frontier/article-
show/6042522.cms>.
55  “North Waziristan operation to be ‘selective’”, Dawn News, 
June 13, 2010, <http://news.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-
library/dawn/news/pakistan/03-north-waziristan-operation-to-be-selective-
ss-11>. 
56  Shuja Nawaz, “Ungovernable”, American Interest, September 
2011, <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=1007>. 
Journal on Terrorism & Security Analysis14
flood control and electricity generation. Such 
projects will ease the suffering of the population 
and garner long term support for the US-Pakistan 
partnership.  
 Since the NATO attack on Pakistani sol-
diers, the relations between the two allies at their 
worst. Pakistan has shut down the NATO supply 
route to Afghanistan and the US is withhold-
ing aid to ratchet up pressure on Pakistan. Such 
reactionary policies are dangerous and only work 
to cause tension between two countries that would 
benefit greatly from close partnership in the war 
on terrorism. Pakistan is well on its way to hav-
ing the fifth largest population on the globe. Its 
military might, nuclear arsenal, strategic partner-
ship with China, combined with the presence 
of extremism ensures a high level of continued 
interes`t from the international community. Hence, 
Pakistan’s future course will remain vital to the US 
even after its troops have withdrawn from Afghan-
istan 
Siloviki Syndicalists
By Frederick S. Schultz 
Introduction
 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
created a power vacuum in the international sys-
tem and forced a realignment of world powers in 
which the United States assumed the role of, to 
quote strategist Colin Gray, the “sheriff of world 
order.”1 Gray’s commentary is based on the U.S. 
monopoly over conventional military power. How-
ever, as this paper will demonstrate, the unique 
nexus of former members of the Soviet security 
services, political and business elite, and orga-
nized crime has served as an effective tool which 
post-Soviet Russia uses to implement its foreign 
policy objectives in place of kinetic military force. 
The failed attempt by U.S. policymakers, in par-
ticular the economist Jeffrey Sachs,  to imple-
ment an Anglo-American style of economy during 
the early years of the Russian Federation (RF), 
has led to  the reemergence of members of the 
security services into government, known as the 
silovki or “strong men.” Vladimir Putin came forth 
from the shadows of the security services to lead 
a resurgent Russia, bolstered by high-oil prices 
and ever expanding commodity exports which 
benefits Russia’s economic and political standing. 
The belief that the United States could transform 
1   Colin S. Gray, “Maintaining Effective Deterrence,” (Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, August, 2003). < http://
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=211>
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Russia’s value systems through the time-honored 
Wilsonian notion of American exceptionalism was 
by and large a failure. Former Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger explained the realities U.S foreign 
policy makers would face in the aftermath of the 
Soviet collapse:
 Students of geopolitics and history are un-
easy about the single-mindedness of this approach 
[an attempt to shock the Russian system into a 
purely democratic and market-oriented state]. 
They fear that, in overestimating America’s abil-
ity to shape Russia’s internal evolution, America 
may involve itself needlessly in internal Russian 
controversies, generate a nationalist backlash, and 
neglect the usual tasks of foreign policy.  They 
would support a policy designed to modify Rus-
sia’s traditional truculence and would for that rea-
son favor economic aid and cooperative projects 
on global issues. They would argue, however, that 
Russia, regardless of who governs it, sits astride 
the territory Halford Mackinder called the geo-
political heartland, and is heir to one of the most 
potent imperial traditions. Even were the postu-
lated moral transformation to occur, it would take 
time, and in that interlude America should hedge 
its bets.2
 Gray and Kissinger were correct. The fact 
that both were right underscores the challenges 
facing the U.S. intelligence community vis-à-vis 
the Russian Federation in the twenty-first cen-
tury. American conventional military supremacy 
and Russia’s subsequent economic and political 
2  Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York; Simon and Schuster, 
1994), p. 814
decline led to systematic hubris among policymak-
ers in Washington.  The intelligence resources 
appropriated towards Russian are disproportion-
ately outlaid toward the old cold war threats of 
conventional and strategic military capabilities. 
Of course, nation-states must appropriate funds 
to the monitoring and collection of data regard-
ing the strategic capabilities of a country like 
Russia. Furthermore, Russian military planners 
must rely more on their strategic and tactical 
nuclear weapons in the face of Russia’s declining 
conventional forces.3 Strategic and conventional 
issues transcend the cold war, but this paper will 
demonstrate that more dangerous threats to U.S. 
and European security have emerged from Russia 
which will require different responses from the 
U.S. intelligence community.
 Kissinger’s commentary rings true. A new 
Russia is growing in influence globally and in 
particular within the former-Soviet Union and 
Europe. Russian influence today is not wielded 
through military might, but through economic ties 
and the direct and indirect networks of former 
or current members of the Soviet and or Russian 
security apparatuses, organized crime, and a busi-
ness class with intimate links with one or both of 
these groups. Former CIA analyst Mark Lowenthal 
accurately describes the more potent threat in the 
present era: “One of the striking challenges of the 
post-cold war period is the decreased emphasis on 
military power and the increased emphasis on eco-
3  Daniel Goure, ‘Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces and Arms Con-
trol: Déjà vu All over Again” in  Stephen J. Blank and Richard Weitz eds. The 
Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald 
(Carlisle, PA; Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), p.305.
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nomic power.”4These networks or nexuses operate 
independently or in unison to promote their own 
individual interests, and the interest of the Krem-
lin’s foreign policy. These nexuses have expanded 
to include foreign government officials, former or 
current members of foreign intelligence services, 
foreign businessmen and other professionals, and 
a panoply of influential private citizens stretching 
from Kyiv to London and even Washington, DC. 
These links are often murky and the intentions 
of the players involved are, at times, difficult to 
determine. These links and nexuses pose a greater 
threat to U.S. national security and the security of 
U.S. allies than Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal.
The U.S. intelligence community is faced with 
the task of penetrating these nexuses, which were 
formed in the closed society of the USSR and 
gradually exported to other countries as the Soviet 
Union liberalized and then collapsed. Economic 
globalization, free trade agreements, and decreased 
travel restrictions have produced the unintended 
consequences of an environment where nexuses 
flourish. For the purposes of this paper, a nexus 
will be defined as follows:
“A relationship between two or more individual 
actors who are acting on behalf of their own inter-
est, the interest of a sovereign nation state, or a 
non-state actor (e.g., a corporate or criminal entity) 
.The motivations or intentions of the actors within 
the nexus may be multi-faceted as they may simul-
taneously represent the interests of one or many 
of the entities in question.”
4  Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4th Ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009),  p.242.
 The U.S. intelligence community should 
develop more robust human intelligence (HU-
MINT) and financial intelligence (FININT) capa-
bilities to deal with the threat of these nexuses. 
Furthermore, the concept of “strategic counterin-
telligence” should be developed in order to com-
bat the threat on the soil of foreign powers before 
the threat penetrate the U.S. homeland.5
 The concept of strategic counterintelli-
gence can be implemented by attacking the nex-
uses in the offshore financial centers (OFCs) in 
which nexuses operate by utilizing specific legal 
mechanisms available to victims of fraud and 
money laundering. The paradox presented to the 
nexuses is that they must deposit or title their 
holdings in jurisdictions which not only possess 
strict banking secrecy laws, but also uphold disclo-
sure orders and freezing orders unique to many of 
these jurisdictions which allow victims or potential 
victims to terminate the nexuses in the offshore 
jurisdiction before the monies can be funneled 
into another country’s economy. Overt and covert 
investigations should be used in conjunction with 
the implementation of these legal proceedings. 
The ability to combat nexuses presents the intelli-
gence community with the opportunity for com-
bining forces with private intelligence and legal 
specialists to protect the interests of the United 
States. Ironically, a nexus of the forces for good is 
necessary in order to defeat the post-Soviet nexus 
which aims to undermine the rule of law and the 
5  For more on the concept of strategic intelligence see: Michelle 
Van Cleave, “Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It and What Should We 
Do About It?” Studies in Intelligence Vol. 51, No. 2 (2007)
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integrity of Western financial systems. In short, 
you need a nexus to defeat a nexus.
Historical Background
 It is important to remember that the Bol-
sheviks executed a coup d’état of the provisional 
government in the fall of 1917. This was not a 
groundswell revolution as many historians have 
suggested. Lenin kept intact many of the bureau-
cratic organs of the state immediately after his as-
cendancy to power including the secret police. The 
dreaded Tsarist Okhrana of Vyacheslav von Plehve 
became the Cheka of Felix Dzerzhinsky. Historian 
Richard Pipes suggests that the Bolsheviks learned 
how to use the secret police to suppress dissent 
from their Tsarist oppressors.
 The people who came to power in Russia 
in October 1917 had grown up under the regime 
of ‘Extraordinary’ and ‘Temporary’ Laws: this was 
the only Russian constitution that they had ever 
known. All of them had been shadowed, searched, 
arrested, kept in jail, and sentenced to exile by the 
political police of the imperial government.6
 In a more precise criticism of the evolution 
of the Russian secret police, former CIA analyst 
and Russian historian Jack Dziak claims that the 
Cheka and its future tributaries (i.e., the GPU, 
NKVD, OGPU, GUGB, NKGB, MGB, and KGB) 
shared more with the “pre-Petrine tradition of 
Muscovy, Ivan the Terrible and his Oprichnina, than 
it did to the relatively ineffectual Okhrana and the 
6  Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1974), p.317
weakened autocracy it inadequately served.”7
 In regard to the analysis of the histori-
cal ties between the Russian security services 
and organized criminal activities, Dziak notes 
the existence of ties between Josef Stalin and his  
eventual NKVD chief, Lavrentiy Beria, to criminal 
organizations in the pre-Soviet Caucasus (Stalin 
was famous for his banditry before and after he 
became politically active) and the Okhrana.8  In 
short, the example of the young Beria and Stalin 
serving as sometime criminals, sometime Okhrana 
informants in their native Caucasus mirrors the 
nexus of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and 
criminal organizations (COs) of the present day.
The Soviet system was corrupt and dehumaniz-
ing, lacking an ideological foundation other than 
continued nebulous references to socialism or 
communism before and after the Second World 
War. Since the ideological rhetoric was hollow and 
did not lead to concrete actions, the USSR experi-
enced a form of inverted Marxism which benefited 
the ruling nomenklatura (political elite) and mem-
bers of the power ministries (security services and 
the military). In addition to the visible beneficia-
ries of the Soviet system, organized crime which 
was active in Tsarist Russia reemerged as a power-
ful force after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. 
Criminal organizations flourished in the power 
vacuum left after Stalin’s death. It is difficult to 
pin-point at what time organized crime became 
intertwined with the Soviet state, but a substan-
7  John J. Dziak Chekisty: A History of the KGB (Massachusetts: 
Lexington Books, 1988), p.7
8  Ibid., p.8
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tial body of evidence suggests that the network 
of organized crime, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 
Bezopasnosti (KGB), and nomenklatura increased 
dramatically with the ascendency of Leonid I. 
Brezhnev to the position of General Secretary 
(1964-1982). Russian organized crime expert Yuriy 
Voronin accurately describes the socioeconomic 
situation during the last three years of the Soviet 
Union’s existence in which the hollow promises 
of socialist utopia became visibly obsolete even 
if criticism of the government’s economic and 
social policies could only take place in the form 
of samizdat (anti-regime writings passed covertly 
among political activists). “Organized crime in 
Russia took root in the fertile irrationalities of a 
planned economy and prospered in the vast black 
and gray markets that emerged in the last three 
decades of Communist rule.”9  The COs, impris-
oned by the NKVD under Stalin suddenly became 
covertly allied with the security apparatus from 
Khrushchev until the Soviet Union’s collapse. The 
one exception to the increase in the nexus of COs 
and the security services took place under the 
leadership of Yuriy V. Andropov (1983-1984), who 
openly attacked this relationship when he fired the 
head of the MVD (Ministry of the Interior) Nikolai 
A. Shchelokov and demoted Brezhnev’s son-in-law 
Lt. Gen. Yuri M. Churbanov for allegedly taking 
bribes from organized crime groups.10 The rela-
tionship between the security services, ruling po-
9  Yuriy A. Voronin, “The Emerging Criminal State: Economic and 
Political Aspects of Organized Crime in Russia” in Phil Williams ed. Russian 
Organized Crime: The New Threat? (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 
p.55
10  “Under Andropov, Policeman’s Lot Isn’t Happy One,” John F. 
Burns, New York Times, August 14, 1983
litical elite, and COs did not end with the hammer 
and sickle being replaced by the tricolor flag of the 
Russian Federation in 1991.
 Patricia Rawlinson has described the rela-
tionship between organized crime and legitimate 
structure (i.e., the recognized governing authority) 
as the “Chameleon Syndrome.” This label is appro-
priate as it reflects “the ability of organized crime, 
through its interaction with legitimate structures, 
to merge with and eventually play the proactive 
role in the Russian state.11 Rawlinson demonstrates 
(see Figures 1a and 2b) the historical development 
of COs and the Russian state from the Tsarist 
period through the late Yeltsin period in juxtaposi-
tion to the criminal nexus of legitimate and illegiti-
mate structures. Absent from Rawlinson’s analysis 
is the specific relationship between the COs and 
the KGB/FSB. If we include this in our analysis, 
then the foundations of the nexus are evident. The 
Chameleon Syndrome, for the purposes of this pa-
per, will be viewed as a model which has been ex-
ported through multiple sources and now operates 
on behalf of the nexuses. This exported model is 
the target for the U.S. intelligence community. The 
nexus is the web woven between legitimate and 
illegitimate structures, which are able to adversely 
affect U.S. interests and U.S national security 
imperatives. Lowenthal points out that the post-
Soviet transformation of the intelligence services 
are not reforms at all, but a metamorphosis into a 
11  Patricia Rawlinson, “Russian Organized Crime: A Brief  History” 
in Phil Williams ed., Russian Organized Crime, p.29; For a more complete 
study of  the Chameleon Syndrome see Patricia Rawlinson, Hunting the 
Chameleon: the problems of  identifying Russian Organized Crime (London; 
University of  London Press, 1998)
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subtle role conducive to a Russia which allows for 
a relatively free-flow of foreign citizens. 
 The SVR [Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki which 
was formerly the KGB’s First Chief Directorate 
responsible for es-
pionage] made much 
of the fact that it has 
reduced its overseas 
presence, attempting 
to portray itself as a 
more benign organi-
zation than its prede-
cessor. Some observ-
ers believe this may 
have been largely 
cosmetic. Russia is 
now more open and 
accessible than was 
the Soviet Union, 
making it easier for 
the SVR to have 
contacts with agents 
in Russia instead 
of overseas. How-
ever, both Britain and 
Germany have re-
ported the presence 
of large numbers of 
Russian spies. MI5 director Evans said there had 
been no decrease in ‘undeclared Russian intelli-
gence officers in the U.K.,’ and that their activities 
and those of the Chinese diverted resources from 
efforts against al-Qaeda. Similarly, the head of 
Germany’s domestic intelligence service [Bundesa-
mt fur Verfassungschutl (BfV)- Federal Office for 
the Protection of the Constitution] said that one 
third of all Russian diplomats in Germany (120 
out of 360) were part of the SVR, working against 
a broad range of 
topics.12
 The ‘Active 
Assimilative’ and 
‘Proactive’ roles 
played between 
legitimate and ill-
legitimate structures 
within the interna-
tional system are 
most appropriate for 
analyzing the nexus 
target.  This late stage 
development repre-
sents the utilization 
of foreign (i.e., out-
side of the Russian 
Federation) struc-
tures to promote the 
goals of the nexuses. 
Nexuses attempt to 
manipulate the grey 
areas between legiti-
mate and quasi-legiti-
mate economic structures (see Appendix 2b ‘Active 
Assimilative’).  The legitimate structures under 
assault may include the Western media, financial 
systems, capital markets, and legal systems, first 
12  Lowenthal, Intelligence,  p.326. See footnote 4. 
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among which are located in OFCs. 
 Economic globalization, through its reli-
ance upon cheap transportation and telecommu-
nications, has created an environment in which 
nexuses thrive.   Global free trade agreements have 
doubled global 
GDP since the 
early 1990s, but as 
economist Moi-
ses Naim points 
out, in the same 
period worldwide 
money-laundering 
has increase near-
ly fifteen fold.13 
Offshore financial 
havens such as the 
Channel Islands, 
Cyprus, British 
Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, 
Mauritius, and 
Marshall Islands, 
not to mention 
traditional fi-
nancial centers 
in Switzerland, 
Austria, and Li-
chtenstein all have banking secrecy laws that the 
nexuses use to launder money14 or to hold titles 
13  Moises Naim, “It’s the Illicit Economy, Stupid,’ Foreign Policy 
No. 151 ( November/December, 2005)
14  The term Money Laundering (ML) is defined as follows: The 
funneling of the monetary proceeds of crime through the financial system 
so as to cover the source of the ill-gotten gain.  ML is a three stage process 
consisting of “placement,” “layering,” and “integration.” Placement consists 
to properties and corporations. Often monies 
titled or vaulted in OFCs are acquired fraudu-
lently. Furthermore, numerous double-taxation 
treaties developed between OFCs, such as that 
between Cyprus and the USSR, for the purpose 
of acquiring 
foreign currency 
and developing 
financial ties to 
Western Europe, 
are now utilized 
to support the 
nexuses. Ar-
cane, Soviet-era 
double-taxation 
treaties have 
stunted econom-
ic productivity 
in many of the 
USSR’s succes-
sor states in-
cluding Ukraine. 
“The nation’s 
[Ukraine] oli-
garchs and loyal 
political elite 
continue to 
profit from these 
of the initial introduction of funds into the financial system. In the layer-
ing phase, the launderer engages in a series of conversions or movements 
of the funds to distance them from their source for instance through the 
purchase or sale of investment instruments. Finally, the funds are inte-
grated into the legitimate economy through the purchase of properties or 
investments. For a more complete definition see the Financial Action Task 
Force explanation of ML at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/29/0,374
6,en_32250379_32235720_33659613_1_1_1_1,00.html Accessed on 26 
October 2011. The criminal definition of ML in the United States is defined 
by 18 U.S.C. §1956 
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sweet tax deals at the nation’s expense,” writes 
reporter Graham Stack. 15 Stack continues:
 Transfer pricing means that subsidiaries 
belonging to one international holding skew the 
prices they charge each other so that company 
profit is realized where tax is least – invariably a 
tax haven. Offshore shareholders use thin capi-
talization schemes to provide funding to their 
onshore companies in the form of loans instead 
of equity. The onshore company’s debt can thus 
exceed its actual capitalization many times over, 
hence the term.
 The point is that the company then pays 
interest to shareholders on these outsize loans, 
instead of declaring profits. Interest is tax deduct-
ible for the company in Ukraine and exempt from 
tax for the offshore shareholder under the terms 
of the Cyprus double taxation treaty.16
 The end result of such an operation is the 
capture of the state by private interest by their 
depriving the state of legitimate tax revenue while 
distributing ill-gotten gains through political pa-
tronage. It is important to remember that nexuses 
are most successful when they do not break the 
law but simply manipulate existing laws to their 
own benefit. Furthermore, the nexus may serve to 
bolster an individual’s net worth while creating a 
favorable economic environment in another state 
where the Kremlin could implement its foreign 
policy through state-controlled multi-national cor-
porations. Just such a case will be discussed in the 
example of the gas trading company RosUkrEn-
15  Graham Stack “High Price of Havens,” Kyiv Post July 29, 2010
16  Ibid.
ergo. 
 Nexuses thrive in the different shades of 
grey made possible by the interaction of different 
legal traditions and cultures. Many of the figures 
examined in this paper employ Western public 
relations firms and legal experts before ever con-
sidering participating in intrigue or assassination. 
Although not immune to utilizing chyernaya rabota 
(black operations), to quote I.V. Stalin, such as in 
the case of the mysterious murder of former FSB 
officer Alexander Litvinenko17, nexuses prefer to 
operate through benign mediums of subversion.
It is instructive to remember, as far as cross-cultur-
al analysis is concerned, what seems highly irra-
tional to a United States citizen, may be perfectly 
rational to Vladimir Putin in understanding the 
role of corruption in society in conjunction with 
the rule of law.
 The opacity of the nexuses outlined in this 
study makes documented resources difficult to 
uncover. However, the relationships between the 
forementioned players within the context of the 
Russia-European natural gas trade provides an 
example of how the nexus operates to achieve mul-
tiple strategic goals. The relationship between for-
mer Stasi captain Mathias Warnig and former KGB 
Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Putin is an example 
of a nexus par excellence, as this relationship has 
17  Litvinenko died by poisoning in November 2006,  after consum-
ing a fatal dosage of  Polonium 210 which was allegedly given to him by 
former FSB agent Andrei Lugovoi after the two met in the Pine Bar of  
the Millennium Hotel in London. Litvinenko had allegedly fallen out of  
favor with President Vladimir Putin after deciding to work for the oligarch 
Boris Berezovsky.  For a summary of  the Litvinenko affair see Chapter 10, 
“Murder Inc.” in Mark Hollingsworth and Stewart Lansley Londongrad: 
From Russia With Cash; The Inside Story of  the Oligarchs (London: Fourth 
Estate, 2009)
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served as the pivot in energy diplomacy between 
Russia and Germany.18 This nexus began when 
the men were working together in East Germany 
during the 1990s and continues to linger. Warnig 
has played a major role in the development of the 
Nord Stream gas pipeline which traverses the Bal-
tic Sea from Russia to Germany.19 Scholar Marshall 
Goldman summarizes the Putin-Warnig nexus:
“…Matthias Warnig was appointed managing direc-
tor of Nord Stream, the company that would build 
and operate the pipeline. Warnig, who at the time 
was board chairman of the Russian branch of Dres-
dner Bank, had worked with Putin in East Germany 
during the 1980s when both were intelligence agents: 
Warnig a captain in the Stasi, the East German Se-
cret Police (or the East German Ministry of Foreign 
Trade, as his official biography describes it), and 
Putin a Lieutenant Colonel in the KGB. Their paths 
crossed again in St. Petersburg when Putin was put 
charge of the mayor’s [Anatoly Sobchak] office for 
foreign economic relations. Warnig negotiated with 
Putin for an operating license in St. Petersburg for 
Dresdner Bank, and it became the first foreign bank 
to receive such permission to operate in St. Peters-
burg.” 20
 Simply stating the obvious about the 
Putin-Warnig relationship would leave this study 
incomplete. More interesting is the relationship 
and goals of the nexuses which take place within 
the gas trade between Vladimir Putin and other 
18  “Report Links Putin to Dresdner,” The St. Petersburg Times 
Tuesday, March 1, 2005. < http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_
id=2&story_id=2858>
19  For more on Matthias Warnig’s role in the Nord Stream pipeline 
project see: Hans Martin-Tillack “A tale of  gazoviki, money and greed,” 
Stern September 13, 2007 
20  Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Rus-
sia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 158-159
siloviki, Gazprom, the Semion Mogilevich Crime 
Group (SMCG), oligarchs, and the government of 
Ukraine through the shadowy gas trading interme-
diary known as RosUkrEnergo (RUE). The RUE 
case demonstrates how the nexuses utilize offshore 
financial centers to pursue their own interests 
independently and in alliance with Kremlin policy.
Case Study: RosUkrEnergo
 Vladimir Putin and the Semion Mogilevich 
Crime Group
 The use of natural gas as an instrument of 
Russian foreign policy is well known to students of 
geopolitics. “With its natural gas and oil pipelines 
that tie Europe to Russia like an umbilical cord, 
Russia has unchecked powers and influence that 
in a real sense exceed the military power and influ-
ence it had in the Cold War.”21
 RosUkrEnergo (RUE) is a gas trading com-
pany and has been registered in the Swiss city of 
Zug since July 22, 2004. It served as an intermedi-
ary trading firm, supplying natural gas from Cen-
tral Asia via the Gazprom-owned pipeline network 
to Ukraine’s state-owned gas company Naftohaz. 
The creation of RUE was announced in July 2004, 
during a meeting in Yalta between Russian presi-
dent Vladimir Putin and his Ukrainian counterpart 
Leonid Kuchma, as the ostensibly “transparent” 
replacement for Eural Trans Gas (ETG), which had 
been serving as the intermediary since late 2002.22 
21  Ibid.,  p.15
22   The owner of  ETG was Dmytro Firtash who, according to 
researcher Roman Kupchinsky, “had little known assets” when he established 
the company yet “received $300 million in credits from Russian banks in 
2003.” See Roman Kupchinsky, “Gazprom’s European Web” The Jamestown 
Foundation, February, 2009, p. 5-6. For a precise history of  ETG and its role 
in the Turkmenistan-Russian-Ukrainian gas trade see: “It’s a Gas: funny 
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The owner of ETG, Dmytro Firtash, has close links 
to the “don of dons” of the Russian mafia, Semion 
Mogilevich.23 Firtash turned out to be the owner of 
45 percent of RUE so the switch in intermediaries 
by presidents Putin and Kuchma and their claim 
that this would bring any sort of change flies in 
the face of the fact that none of the ETG interests 
were displaced by the creation of RUE. 
 The FBI’s Intelligence Section issued an 
extensive report on the Semion Mogilevich Orga-
nization in August, 1998. The reports states: “The 
corruptive influence of the Mogilevich Organiza-
tion apparently extends to the Russian security 
services and top-level government officials.”24  
 The report also links Mogilevich to the 
Italian Comorra and New York-based Genovese 
La Cosa Nostra.25 Mogilevich is currently on the 
FBI’s Most Wanted list for defrauding sharehold-
ers YBM Magnex, a Pennsylvania-based firm, of 
$150 million. The federal indictment of Mogilevich 
and co-defendants Igor Fisherman, Jacob Bogatin, 
and Anatoly Tsoura, states that they “implemented 
the scheme to defraud using companies and bank 
accounts in over twenty different countries, in-
business in the Turkmen-Ukrainian Gas Trade” Global Witness April, 2006. 
23  In December, 2002, then U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Carlos 
Pascual warned the Ukrainian government about the Firtash-Mogilevich 
link. “In December 2002, just a few months ago, Ukraine signed several 
agreements that increased Gazprom’s control over NAK Naftog[h]az and 
its activities. Itera [also a Russian gas trading company with a U.S. office in 
Jacksonville, Florida], seen by many as a Gazprom competitor, was pushed 
out of  the Ukrainian market and substituted for a new Gazprom intermedi-
ary, Eural Trans Gas. According to press accounts, Eural Trans Gas was 
registered in Hungary the day before the contract was signed with just 
$12,000 in charter capital. In addition, media reports link Eural Trans Gas 
with organized crime figure Semion Mogilevich, who was recently indicted 
in the United States.” Speech by Ambassador Pascual, May 23, 2003. As cited 
in Kupchinsky, Gazprom, p.6
24  Semion Mogilevich Organization, Eurasian Organized Crime, 
Department of  Justice, Federal Bureau of  Investigation, prepared by the 
Intelligence Section, Organizational Intelligence Unit (August, 1998), p.34
25  Ibid., pp.31, 33
cluding offshore locations such as the Republic of 
Nauru in the South Pacific, the Cayman Islands, 
and Nevis in the Caribbean, as well as Canada, 
England, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Ukraine and 
Russia, in order to make it more difficult for law 
enforcement authorities, securities regulators, as 
well as YBM Magnex’s auditors and forensic exam-
iners, to uncover the true nature of their criminal 
operations.”26 President Obama mentioned Mogile-
vich in his Strategy to Combat Transnational Orga-
nized Crime, released in July 2011.
 Semion Mogilevich is wanted by the United 
States for fraud, racketeering, and money laun-
dering and was recently added to the FBI’s Ten 
Most Wanted fugitives list. Mogilevich and sev-
eral members of his criminal organization were 
charged in 2003 in the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania in a 45-count racketeering indictment with 
involvement in a sophisticated securities fraud and 
money-laundering scheme, in which they alleg-
edly used a Pennsylvania company, YBM Magnex, 
to defraud investors of more than $150 million. 
Even after that indictment—and being placed on 
the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list—Mogilevich has 
continued to expand his criminal empire. Mogile-
vich was arrested by Russian police on tax charges 
in January 2008 and was released pending trial 
in July 2009. Other members of his organization 
remain at large.27
 The necessity for a company such as RUE 
is negligible as the price of Central Asian gas is 
26  United States of  America v. Semion Mogilevich; Igor Fisherman; 
Jacob Bogatin; Anatoly Tsoura Criminal No. 02-157 (A), (30), (d), p. 15-16
27   The President of  the United States, Strategy to Combat Trans-
national Organized Crime (Washington, DC,  July, 2011), p.21
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negotiated directly between Gazprom and the 
governments of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan without the help of RUE, a company 
that does not own any gas production facilities 
or pipelines and is therefore unable to influence 
negotiations.28 Given the fact that Gazprom is not 
only a monopolist supplier to Ukraine but also a 
monopsonist29 purchaser of Central Asian gas, one 
is forced to ponder the question why one state 
owned company, Gazprom, needs an intermediary 
company with no pipeline infrastructure to sell 
gas to Ukraine’s state-owned firm Naftohaz. The 
answer to this riddle cuts directly to the goal of the 
goals of the nexuses that operate RUE. RUE serves 
the foreign policy goals of the Kremlin, which 
seeks to draw, in this case Ukraine, but also other 
post-Soviet states, back into Russia’s sphere of 
influence. Energy supplies are used to coerce and 
manipulate these states into adopting more mal-
leable policies towards Russia regarding a variety 
of issues including the rejection of NATO enlarge-
ment, continuance of Russian military installations 
on the foreign state’s soil (e.g., the Black Sea Fleet 
in Sevastopol, Ukraine) and subjugation of these 
states’ policy-making apparatuses to the will of 
Moscow.30 In Ukraine and Belarus, the fact that the 
ethnic and linguistic make-up of their populations 
is similar to Russia’s (largely Orthodox Christian 
28  Kupchinsky, Gazprom, p.7. See footnote 25.
29  The term ‘monopsonist’ is used to describe Gazprom’s relation-
ship as the sole purchaser of  Turkemenistan’s natural gas. For more, see 
Margarita M. Balmaceda, Energy Dependency, Politics and Corruption in the 
Former Soviet Union: Russia’s power, oligarchs’ profits and Ukraine’s miss-
ing energy policy, 1995-2006 (New York: Routledge, 2008), p.3-4
30  Paul Goble, “Ukraine’s Options to Counter Russia are Limited” 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty September 23, 2009. <http://www.rferl.
org/content/Ukraines_Options_To_Counter_Russia_Are_Limited/1829268.
html>
Slavs) makes them the immediate target of a Rus-
sia faced with a looming demographic disaster 
should Russia not be able to co-opt states like 
Ukraine back into the proverbial “overlordship of 
Muscovy.”31 
 The manipulation of energy resources in 
the trading relationships between energy rich 
countries such as Russia and energy poor ones 
such as Ukraine and Belarus produce ‘rents of 
dependency’32 which in turn allow private citi-
zens to capture state power through the monies 
acquired fraudulently in the natural gas trade. 
Eventually, these rents, which are almost always 
gathered through some sort of fraudulent relation-
ship, are used to coerce the state into formulating 
policy based on the interests of the elites which 
control the relationship. In short, the private 
citizens grow richer in exchange for monies fun-
neled to politicians who in the case of Ukraine 
produce policies favorable to Moscow.33 These poli-
cies include the extension of the lease of the port 
31  Nicholas Eberstadt and Aproova Shah, “Russia’s Demographic 
Disaster” American Enterprise Institute, May, 2009. <http://www.aei.org/
article/society-and-culture/citizenship/russias-demographic-disaster/>
32  The phrase “rents of energy dependency” is taken from numerous 
literatures composed by Margarita M. Balmaceda and is defined as follows: 
“By rents of energy dependency we are referring to whatever unearned 
benefits an economic group within a country (or, for that matter, a regime or 
a country as a whole) may receive from the continuation of energy depen-
dency relationships, especially with longstanding partners, in this case Russia. 
Such rents of dependency can take a variety of forms: from, on the one hand, 
the subsidy effect experienced by a whole economy (such as in the case of 
Belarus) to, on the other the concrete benefits received by specific economic 
groups. Legal, semi-legal, or illegal businesses with privileged access to 
insider information and political networks have been able to take advantage of 
the profitable arbitrage possibilities created by a situation in which the energy 
market has not been liberalized and where differences between domestic, 
“near abroad” and export prices continue to be significant despite the gradual 
move toward market based trade relations. See, for instance, Margarita M. 
Balmaceda, Energy Dependency., p. 9
33  John Marone, “Sovereign Surrender” Kyiv Post, May 7, 2010. 
<http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/66019/>; See also, Freder-
ick Schultz, “Target Ukraine: How the issues of  Fuel, Fraud, and the Fleet 
threaten the independence of  Russia’s neighbor,” The Officer, October-
November, 2010
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facilities in Sevastopol to the Russian Black Sea 
Fleet (RBSF) from 2017 until 2042 made by the 
current government of Viktor Yanukovych in ex-
change for a mythical natural gas discount which 
had been previously agreed to by then (January, 
2009) prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, who is 
now imprisoned by Ukrainian authorities.34 Fur-
thermore, the Yanukovych government also ceded 
to the Kremlin’s request to allow for the basing 
of Russian FSB officers in Sevastopol.35 Former 
Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) chief Valentyn 
Nalyvaychenko explicitly stated why the return 
of the FSB to the Crimea would have a negative 
impact on Ukraine. “Russian counter-intelligence 
have undertaken on our territory unfriendly ac-
tions, including the covert collection of, and steps 
towards, collecting secret information and thereby 
infringing the Criminal Code of Ukraine.”36 The 
surrender of the Ukrainian basing facilities for an 
additional 25-30 years and the redeployment of the 
FSB to the Crimea represent the end result of the 
Kremlin’s use of natural gas as a political weapon. 
The numerous instances of supply termination by 
Gazprom, through RUE, to Ukraine and subse-
quently the Central and Western European con-
sumers has created the conditions for long-term 
political concessions to be made by Ukraine to 
34  Edward Chow describes the Tymoshenko agreement of January 
2009 as follows: “One of the fundamental flaws of the January 19, 2009, as 
sale and purchase agreement is that it set too high a base price for Russian gas 
to Ukraine. The $330 per 1,000 cubic meter price we are told Ukraine would 
have had to pay for Russian gas this quarter is higher than the Russian gas sale 
price to Western Europe today (April 22, 2010)….The ’30 percent discount’ 
of 2010  [Yanukovych agreement] is just as phony as the ‘20 percent discount’ 
of 2009.”See Edward Chow, “Bad deal all around” Kyiv Post April 22, 2010. 
<http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/64766/>
35  Taras Kuzio, “The FSB Returns to Ukraine” May 24, 2010.  
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=36411 >
36  Ibid.
Russia. This created a pipeline “pincer movement” 
in which European consumers like Germany ap-
plied diplomatic pressure on Ukraine while the 
Kremlin-Gazprom axis applies pressure from the 
supply side of the ledger. 
 Although Tymoshenko successfully termi-
nated the relationship between RUE Gazprom and 
Naftohaz in 2009, her motivations for doing so ap-
pear to be motivated by political considerations in 
undercutting Mr. Firtash and his support to Yanu-
kovych’s Party of Regions. Tymoshenko, who hails 
from the same city as Mogilevich, Dnepropetrovsk, 
only entered politics after her gas trading business, 
United Energy Systems of Ukraine (UESU), was 
deprived of political patronage in the wake of the 
fall and subsequent arrest in the United States of 
her one-time business partner and former Prime 
Minister, Pavlo Lazarenko. Under Tymoshenko’s 
watch, UESU wired $120 million to Lazarenko’s 
offshore accounts in Switzerland and Antigua.37 
Lazarenko was convicted in the United States 
of mail fraud and money laundering as a result 
of transferring monies made in the gas trade 
to banking accounts in the U.S. Lazarenko was 
found guilty in U.S. Federal Court in the Northern 
District of California and Ms. Tymoshenko, often 
lauded in the U.S. media as a stalwart of supporter 
of democracy, was named an unindicted co-con-
spirator in the case.38 Ms. Tymoshenko refused to 
37  Matthew Kaminski, “The Rise and Fall of Yulia Tymoshenko,” 
The Wall Street Journal,  October 24, 2011. < http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424052970203914304576629001126377580.html>
38  United States of America v. Pavel Lazarenko Supplemental Mo-
tion in Limine to Admit Statements of Yulia Tymoshenko as Co-conspirator 
United States District Court Northern District of California San Francisco 
Division, March 30, 2004
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cooperate with the U.S. Department of Justice.
Tymoshenko has been praised as the individual 
who finally terminated the role of RUE as part of 
the January 19, 2009 gas agreement (see above). 
This act certainly had a short-lived negative effect 
on the business interests of Dmytro Firtash and 
his backer Semion Mogilevich, but did this serve 
the interests of Tymoshenko’s political career? For-
mer SBU (Ukrainian Intelligence Service) officer 
Nalyvaychenko claims that Tymoshenko ordered 
his predecessor Oleksandr Turchynov to destroy 
a top secret dossier on Semion Mogilevich that 
linked him to past business dealings with Tymosh-
enko.39 Was Tymoshenko concerned with the pos-
sibility of kompromat (blackmail) in light of the fact 
that she fully intended to seek the presidency after 
her political marriage with President Viktor Yush-
chenko ended in a bitter divorce?
 Vladimir Putin is also alleged to be linked 
to Mogilevich. Mykola Melnychenko, a member of 
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma’s security de-
tail, taped a conversation February 8, 2000 between 
then SBU chief Leonid Derkach and President 
Kuchma which suggested Putin and Mogilevich 
have known each other since Putin lived and 
worked in St. Petersburg. 
Kuchma: “Have you found Mogilevich?” 
Derkach: “I found him.” 
Kuchma: “So, are you two working now?” 
Derkach: “We’re working. We have another meeting 
tomorrow. He arrives incognito. 
Later in the discussion Derkach revealed a few de-
39  “Nalyvaychenko, Former SBU chief, talks about corruption, shady 
gas trade, Gongadze murder” Kyiv Post, December 10, 2010. < http://www.
kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/92518/>.
tails about Mogilevich. 
Derkach: “He’s on good terms with Putin. He and 
Putin have been in contact since Putin was still in 
Leningrad.”40 
Kuchma: “I hope we won’t have any problems be-
cause of this.” 41
 
 Unconfirmed reports linked Putin to Mo-
gilevich through the late Roman Tsepov, whom 
Putin knew since he worked in St. Petersburg with 
Mayor Anatoly Sobchak’s office. Tsepov’s firm, 
Baltik-Eskort, provided security for Sobchak and 
Putin.42 Tsepov was murdered by poison around 
September 24, 2004 and, as journalist Charles 
Gurin notes, the fact that Tsepov was representing 
himself as an ally of President Putin may have led 
to his demise.
 Moskovskiye Novosti reported in July that 
Tsepov had presented himself to Yukos sharehold-
ers as essentially having been commissioned by 
Sechin [Igor Sechin is a former GRU officer and 
was Putin’s Presidential Chief of Staff], Zolotov 
[Viktor Zolotov worked for Baltik-Eskort and 
served as head of President Putin’s security ser-
vice], and even Putin to “come to terms” with the 
embattled oil company. “As soon as the ‘Kremlin 
representative’ asked for a big advance on his ser-
vices, his powers were called into question. Tse-
pov’s former relationship with Zolotov and Sechin 
40  Leningrad changed its name to St. Petersburg shortly after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union. 
41  Roman Kupchinsky, “The Strange Ties between Semion Mogi-
levich and Vladimir Putin,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 6 No. 57 March 25, 
2009. <http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=34753>
42  Charles Gurin, “Roman Tsepov, R.I.P.,” Eurasia Daily Moni-
tor Volume: 1 No. 93 September 26, 2004. < http://www.jamestown.org/
single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=26907>
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and possibly also with Putin is a hard fact, but 
the level and quality of his present-day contacts 
are, basically, a matter of speculation” (Moskovskiye 
Novosti, July 9). 43
 It is clear that Mogilevich is connected at 
the highest levels of the Russian government. After 
being arrested in January, 2008 in Moscow on tax 
evasion charges along with Vladimir Nekrasov in 
relation to their cosmetic business Arbat-Prestige, 
Mogilevich was released without comment around 
July of 2009.44 
 It is clear that the SMCG has now assumed 
a ‘proactive’ role, to quote Rawlinson (See Fig-
ures 1a and 2b) in relationship to the Russian and 
Ukrainian governments. Evidence suggests that 
Mogilevich not only wields tremendous influence 
in his native Ukraine, but also at the highest pol-
icy-making levels of the Russian Federation (see 
above). Dmytro Firtash’s monies made through 
ETG and later RUE were sources of financial sup-
port for the Party of Regions and President Viktor 
Yanukovych. Mogilevich established ties to Firtash 
through offshore financial companies (see below), 
and the policy prescriptions of the Yanukovych 
regime are lock-step with the Kremlin’s desire to 
co-opt Ukraine back into the Russian sphere of in-
fluence. The unsolved question is how U.S. intelli-
gence services can target intermediaries like RUE, 
the epicenter of the nexus, and counteract their 
destructive influence in a country like Ukraine. 
First, we must diagnose the nexus of RUE and see 
43  Moskovskiye Novosti (“Moscow News”) July 9, 2004 as cited in 
Ibid.
44  “Mogilevich, Nekrasov Charged,” Moscow Times, January 31, 
2008
what weapons are available to the U.S. and its al-
lies in order to counteract these murky structures 
and the players involved with them.
RosUkrEnergo’s Offshore Web
 RUE was to be an equal partnership with 
fifty-percent owned by Gazprom through its affili-
ate Gazprombank and the Ukrainian side man-
aged by Austria’s Raiffeisen Zentral Bank (RZB). 
RUE initially had two co-directors. Konstantin 
Chuychenko, a former KGB officer and head of 
Gazprom’s legal department, represented the Rus-
sian side of RUE.45 Oleg Palchykov was the former 
director of the ETG office in Moscow and repre-
sented the hidden owners of RUE (the Ukrainian 
side) owned by RZB through the Viennese-reg-
istered company Centragas.46 Interestingly, at the 
time Palchykov represented ETG, he was also the 
Moscow representative of Highrock Properties, 
Elmstad, and Lindown.47 Highrock Properties was 
of particular interest because its Board of Direc-
tors includes Igor Fisherman who is wanted by 
the FBI in connection with the YBM Magnex case 
(see above) and is described in the indictment 
as ‘a close associate and top financial advisor to 
defendant Mogilevich.’48 The wives of Mogilevich 
and Fisherman, Galina Telish and Olga Zunze-
rova, were also on the board of Highrock. The late 
journalist Roman Kupchinsky highlights the links 
45  Kupchinsky, Gazprom,  p. 9. See footnote 25.
46  Ibid., p. 11
47  Ibid.
48  Ibid., p. 12. The indictment of Mogilevich and Fisherman regard-
ing YBM Magnex may be read at: http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/ruslobby-mogilevich-04172007.pdf.
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between Highrock, ETG, Firtash, and Telish in 
the following footnote from his 2009 monograph 
Gazprom’s European Web: 
 A search of Cypriote-registered companies 
revealed that on December 31, 2000, a company 
called Agatheas Trading Ltd was registered in 
Nicosia. On December 28, 2000, the first share-
holder of Agatheas became Niki Nicolaou (54A 
Nicodmou Mylona str, Ayios Nicolaos, Limassol, 
Cyprus) owning 1,000 shares. That same day Niki 
Nicolaou was appointed director of the company 
and Electra Erotocritou, the company secretary. 
On January 30, 2001, Niki Nicolaou resigned as 
the director and Galina Telesh (address Veresaeva 
St. 6-97, Moscow, Russia) was appointed director. 
Telesh was the wife of Semyon Mogilevich. On 
January 15, 2001, Firtash changed the name of 
Highrock Holding to Simia Holdings in Limesol, 
Cyprus. In the document it is stated that among 
the shareholders of Simia Holdings was Agatheas 
Holding with 2,745,000 shares. Agatheas was, at 
the time, controlled by Galina Telesh, Mogilevich’s 
wife. Two years later, on February 24, 2003, Electra 
Erotocritou resigned as company secretary of Ag-
atheas and Mittelmeer Secretaries Ltd (10 Doiranis 
St. Engomi, Nicosia, Cyprus) was appointed to 
this position. Niki Nicolaou gave her 1,000 shares 
to Mittelmeer Nominee Ltd. On June 1, 2003, six 
months after Eural Trans Gas had been active, 
Telesh resigned and was replaced by Firtash. The 
Agatheas structure remained intact until July 2007. 
49Goldman’s remarks are more succinct.
The shenanigans of Highrock, RUE, ITERA (the 
forerunner of Eural Trans Gas), and Gazprom il-
lustrate the skill with which veterans of the black 
market in the Soviet era have learned to manipu-
late the market system and obfuscate their opera-
tions from even sophisticated investors. How they 
learned to build such a web of false fronts hidden 
assets for themselves despite having grown up 
in a system of relatively simple central planning 
remains a mystery. Where did they learn such 
sophisticated schemes? It was not taught to them 
in Soviet institutions of higher learning or in Gos-
plan, the state central planning agency.50
  It is this Ukrainian “side” of RUE which 
exemplifies the tentacles of the nexuses between 
political elites, former KGB like Putin, and leaders 
of organized crime groups like Mogilevich.
Kupchinsky performed excellent research into the 
web of nameplate companies created to mask the 
ownerships of the hyper-influential RUE. The web 
weaves a path from Gazprom and the Ukrainian 
side (Dmytro Firtash 45% and Ivan Fursin 5%) 
through numerous name plate companies domi-
ciled in OFCs. RUE, like many gas intermediaries, 
utilized OFCs in order to hide the ultimate ben-
eficial owners (UBOs) of the organization. Switzer-
land, Lichtenstein, and Austria were also used to 
create shell corporations used to mask the UBOs 
of RUE. The UBOs were masked in order to shield 
their association with organized crime, in particu-
lar Semion Mogilevich. 
49  Kupchinsky, Gazprom,  p. 32. See footnote 25.
50  Goldman, Petrostate, p. 148. See footnote 23. 
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 The Austria connection is of particular 
interest as Austria’s neutrality and non-NATO 
status made it a favorite playground of the KGB 
and other Warsaw pact security services during the 
cold war. Furthermore, Austria has strict bank-
ing secrecy laws that allow financial institutions 
to refuse to disclose the identity of a company’s 
principles. The KGB setup Donau Bank (renamed 
VTB Bank after the fall of the USSR) and the trad-
ing company IMAG (Investment Management and 
Advisory Group), renamed Dehel GmbH.51Andrei 
Akimov, who once ran Donau Bank, is now chair-
man of the management Board of Gazprombank 
which until January 16, 2007 owned 50 percent 
of RUE (the shares were purchased by Gazprom-
bank’s parent company Gazprom).52 Not surpris-
ingly, Vienna serves as the base for the largest SVR 
station in Europe.53 
 The role jurisdictions that Cyprus and 
Austria play in allowing nexuses to operate cannot 
be emphasized enough. Dmytro Firtash, Gazprom, 
and Mogilevich all use OFCs as the locales for 
concealing their business dealings through nomi-
nee shareholders and other financial shenanigans 
to influence the policies of decision-makers in 
East/Central Europe and perhaps even in Western 
countries such as the United Kingdom.  
 RUE has made Firtash so wealthy and 
influential that the CEO of his holding company 
GroupDF, Robert Shelter-Jones, saw fit to try and 
gain influence on Firtash’s behalf with a high 
51  Kupchinsky, Gazprom., p.17. See footnote 25.
52  Ibid.
53  “Why Russia’s Intelligence Service Needs a New Chief,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Digest, October 19, 2007 as cited in Ibid.
ranking elected official in the British government. 
Shelter-Jones funneled £30,000 towards the cam-
paign of UK politician Baroness Pauline Neville-
Jones who was slated to become National Security 
Advisor to Prime Minister David Cameron before 
MI5 produced a report linking her to both Firtash 
and oligarch Mikhail Chernoy.54
 The overall goal of men like Firtash is to 
make money, but his links to Mogilevich and their 
link to the Kremlin allow him to be coerced into 
acting on behalf of other interests. Terminating 
Firtash’s ability to make money and to use OFCs 
to conceal assets and launder cash is central to 
solving the problem presented by the nexuses. 
Individuals like Firtash must be denied access to 
Western financial markets, in particular those of 
the United States, at all cost. Staunching the flow 
of money will terminate the ability of the nexus to 
operate.
 The role OFCs play in masking ownership, 
providing cover for fraud schemes, and laundering 
the fruits of the crime must be understood so that: 
1) proper intelligence targets may be established 
(especially third-party facilitators who may be 
innocent, i.e., a bank); 2) overt and covert opera-
tions may proceed to determine link-data-analysis 
(LDA) between the members of the nexuses; and 
3) a legal plan of action may be created to disrupt 
and terminate the nexus in the OFC. The legal 
measures must be applicable to the jurisdiction of 
the OFC in question. Luckily for crime fighters, 
54  “MI5 ‘vetoed Security Minister over links to Ukrainian oli-
garchs’,” Christopher Leake and Mark Hollingsworth, Daily Mail, August 15, 
2010. < http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1303215/MI5-vetoed-Securi-
ty-Minister-Baroness-Pauline-Neville-Jones-links-Ukrainian-oligarchs.html>
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many OFCs, including Cyprus (a holdover from its 
British colonial tradition) fall under the auspices 
of English common law. Although OFCs’ banking 
practices vary, most include strict banking secrecy 
laws and secrecy laws surrounding incorporated 
entities (referred to as ‘name plate corporations’ 
because they do not possess material assets and 
are used simply to shield the UBO). 
Towards a Cooperative Solution: 
How the Intelligence Community can 
Dissuade and Deter Nexuses from 
Achieving their Goals and Objectives
 
 The first step in combating the nexuses 
discussed above is to encourage the United States 
intelligence community, in particular the CIA, 
to develop a more robust HUMINT capability in 
OFCs and in financial centers such as Vienna and 
Zurich, but also in locales such as Cyprus, Macao, 
Mauritius, British Virgin Islands, Channel Islands, 
and Bermuda just to name a few. Intelligence 
agents should be well-versed in forensic account-
ing and understand the respective jurisdictions’ 
laws governing financial institutions. The CIA 
should work in conjunction with the Department 
of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) and Financial Crimes Enforcement Net-
work (FinCEN) to train field operatives to collect 
relevant financial data on nexuses operating in 
OFCs.  Notwithstanding the issues surrounding 
personal privacy, Treasury may utilize the SWIFT 
(Society for Worldwide International Financial 
Telecommunications) to track financial flows and 
misappropriated funds in order to target and ter-
minate the nexuses’ objectives.55
 In the post-9/11 period, the FBI has under-
standably shifted its “pendulum of focus” toward 
combating terrorist activities. In light of the fact 
that more organized crime groups and terrorist 
organizations sought to use OFCs to mask the 
financing of their activities, the FBI would be well-
served to deploy more of its capabilities and exper-
tise to a role it has traditionally targeted: combat-
ing fraud and money laundering. The necessity for 
collaboration with CIA, Treasury, the private sector, 
and international organizations created for the 
specific purpose of protecting the financial sys-
tem from unlawful penetration and use cannot be 
emphasized enough. Therefore, the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) should 
be utilized as the center for interagency collabora-
tion along with the contracting center for private 
sector participants. ODNI can apportion appropri-
ate funds from each agency to attack the nexuses.
 The solution to the problem of nexuses 
is to attack them in the OFCs which they use to 
conceal the ownership of fraudulently acquired as-
sets and launder monies to influence peddlers and 
policymakers in the country they want to coerce. 
At present nearly 800,000 companies are regis-
tered in the British Virgin Islands. A 2006 estimate 
concluded that at least 50 percent of all currency 
transactions processed internationally involve 
OFCs.56 In the BVI, as in most other OFCs, the fol-
lowing public information is available about these 
55  Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.259. See footnote 4. 
56  Offshore Financial Services Information Center, available at: 
http://www.bviibc.com/about.htm as cited in Martin Kenney, “Combating 
International Fraud,” Mondaq News, February 4, 2010.
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companies:
The name;
The date of incorporation;
The current status [i.e., whether or not the corpora-
tion is active by paying its yearly registration fee];
Copies of the articles of incorporation;
The registered agent and its address [one registered 
agent may have registered thousands of companies],
The following are not available:
Names of beneficial owners;
Names of any creditors;
The identity of the payer of annual administration 
costs in the BVI;
The names of the directors are not publicly avail-
able.57
 
 Open-source intelligence (OSINT) can be 
an excellent starting-point for more developed col-
lection of information especially when married to 
a legal case designed to attack nexuses’ fraud and 
money-laundering activities. The sources used to 
research this monograph prove the value of inves-
tigative journalism and the World Wide Web. The 
Internet is a relatively untapped resource. Lowen-
thal explains:
 “Experienced intelligence practitioners have dis-
covered that the Internet- meaning searches among 
various sites- yields no more than 3 to 5 percent of 
the total OSINT take. That is why practitioners spend 
much time on what is called the “Deep Web,” mean-
ing that a much larger portion of the Web that has 
not been indexed by search engines. Some experts 
estimate that the Deep Web is roughly some 500 
times bigger than the easily accessible Web.”58
57  Ibid.
58  Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.105. See footnote 3. 
 Basic fundamentals in Internet investiga-
tions begin with an appreciation of the CRAWL 
(Communicate Research Analyze Write Listen) 
process. Cynthia Hetherington, an investigator 
who specializes in using the Internet to investigate 
financial crime and conduct corporate due dili-
gence states that all OSINT professionals should 
be fluent in the CRAWL process. “As varied as 
these fields [of investigation] are, these experts all 
need to know the fundamentals of CRAWLing.”59 
More complex data collection techniques are 
available through the implementation of software 
driven solutions that tend to be expensive. Fur-
thermore, analysts should have a familiarity with 
LDA diagramming so as to be able to track and 
monitor money flows.
 Preemptive disclosure and freezing orders 
are available in one of the nexuses favorite OFC-
Cyprus.60 Specialized legal firms may appear ex 
parte, before the court in Nicosia or Limassol and 
present a Norwich Pharmacal Bankers Trust Docu-
ment (NPBT) which must meet prima facia criteria 
in order to be approved by the court. Civil search 
orders known as Anton Piller orders may be grant-
ed in an ex parte proceeding allowing a legal team 
to search computers and documents for evidence 
of fraud and other financial crime. Finally, a Ma-
reva injunction may be ordered by a court in order 
59  Cynthia Hetherington, Business Background Investigations: Tools 
and Techniques for Solution Driven Due Diligence (Tempe, Arizona: Facts on 
Demand Press, 2010), p21
60 * Author’s Note: The civil disclosure and freezing orders described 
in this paper are not allowed in the United States of America or in jurisdictions 
such as Austria and Switzerland. The United States, generally speaking, has 
too many due process laws for potential wrongdoers and thus ex parte dis-
closure and freezing orders are incongruent with the United States Constitu-
tion. Austria and Switzerland, whose legal traditions derive from the Code of 
Justinian and not the English common law, require criminal proceedings to be 
initiated before freezing orders will be granted.
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to freeze monies acquired through illegal activity.
“Gagging orders frequently accompany pre-emptive 
search (or Anton Piller) orders, information (or Norwich 
Pharmacal/Bankers trust) orders, and asset freezing 
(or Mareva) injunctions. Their purpose is threefold- 
firstly, as alluded to above, to prevent a discovery target 
from tipping off the underlying obligor or malefactor; 
secondly to protect the alleged underlying wrongdoers 
from further reputational damage [for example a bank 
that had unknowing facilitated a wrong] if it became 
known they had become the subject to a search order; 
and finally to uphold public confidence in the fair ad-
ministration of justice.”61
 This paper argues in favor of a collective 
intelligence effort beginning with collaboration of 
Western intelligence agencies with organizations 
such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
and the Egmont Group which specialize in com-
bating money laundering and developing financial 
intelligence. The FATF has played an important 
role in other overt efforts to combat, for instance, 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), through its participation in the Prolifera-
tion Security Initiative (PSI). Thus, the mecha-
nisms used to combat the financing of the nexuses 
have a dual-use role of combating the financing of 
WMD proliferation and terrorist activities. A col-
laborative effort should be made through special-
ized law firms which are trained to obtain ex parte 
disclosure and freezing orders in OFC jurisdic-
tions in order to terminate the money flows of the 
nexuses. Specific recommendations to the United 
61  Martin Kenney, “British Virgin Islands: The Use Of Sealing and 
Gagging Relief in Complex Insolvency Proceedings Involving the Investiga-
tion of Fraud and Discovery of Hidden Assets” Mondaq News, July 22, 2010
States Intelligence community include the funding 
and training of more robust HUMINT and FININT 
capabilities.
 Intelligence organizations offer the benefit 
of their expertise in covert data collections and in-
vestigations to answer questions relating to “how” 
a particular financial crime took place. It is impor-
tant to remember that the perpetrator of a fraud 
is generally known, but how the crime was com-
mitted is much more difficult to prove. Therefore, 
the entire investigative process must utilize both 
forward traces (from the commission of the crime) 
and reverse traces (from the point the ill-gotten 
monies were spent) in order to determine not only 
how the fraud was committed but what other enti-
ties may be beneficiaries from the fraud.  
 Covert action is not exclusively the pur-
view of the U.S. and allied intelligence community. 
Many private investigative and security services 
may utilize covert investigative processes in order 
to determine how a financial crime was commit-
ted and who has benefitted. However, intelligence 
agencies have more capabilities and trained pro-
fessionals to execute such investigations. In order 
to maximize results, intelligence agencies can work 
in collaboration with specialized legal firms to 
provide covertly attained information to the firm 
which is planning a legal challenge to uncover 
who the UBO, which is hiding behind a series 
of nameplate corporations. Thus the CIA could 
provide information to the legal firm on where the 
hidden monies are being housed, for instance in a 
Cyprus bank account. The legal firm now “knows 
where to look” and can begin the legal process of 
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interests of the state, group, or individual actor. 
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies in 
partnership with specialized legal and asset recov-
ery teams may target the nexuses globally, but in 
particular in the OFCs, which possess laws favor-
able to masking fraud and money laundering. The 
CIA’s HUMINT capabilities must be increased in 
countries whose banking secrecy laws may be used 
by the nexuses to achieve malevolent objectives. 
The legal process available in English common law 
jurisdictions should be employed to seize the as-
sets of any member of the nexus or third-party fa-
cilitator. If the new FSB is in fact a business, then 
the operations of the business must be targeted 
and attacked so the business will cease operations. 
A business runs on money and if the monies fuel-
ing an operation are frozen, that operation ceases 
to function. In short, a proverbial nexus of “good” 
meaning an alliance of those devoted to upholding 
the rule of law must work cooperatively to termi-
nate the nexuses of siloviki, organized criminals, 
and corrupt businessmen operating in the post-
Soviet space 
building a case in order to attain a NPBT order 
and Anton Piller orders with the eventual objec-
tive of freezing the assets (Mareva injunction) of 
the perpetrators (i.e., the players in the nexus).
 All investigations must begin with specific 
goals in mind. Investigative steps must be based 
on logical assumptions of the necessary sequence 
of events.62 Covert data collection should be mar-
ried to investigations and legal proceedings. All 
cases will not be appropriate for using courts to 
target the nexuses. At this point the pendulum 
swings heavily to the intelligence community 
where mission-based counterintelligence tech-
niques, to quote Jennifer Simms, may be employed 
to dissuade nexuses from using the financial sys-
tems to achieve their objectives.63
 The destructive role of the nexus as de-
scribed in this paper is clear. Acts of corruption 
and fraud have served to undermine the sover-
eignty of nations such as Ukraine and the integrity 
of financial markets worldwide. Yevgenia Albats 
has stated: “The FSB is no longer just a police 
organization, it is a business.”64 Certain businesses, 
in particular the transportation of natural gas from 
Russia to its European neighbors, provides fertile 
ground for the security services to work in unison 
with organized crime and entrenched political 
and business elites in order to achieve an eclectic 
variance of goals.  The goals may be based on the 
62  David P. Metzger and Sarah Duncan, “Facing the Facts: Keys to 
an effective investigations’” Investigations Quarterly Vol. 1, Issue.8,  2010
63  Jennifer E. Simms, “Twenty-first Century Counterintelligence: 
The Theoretical Basis for Reform,” pp.19-20 in Simms, Jennifer and Gerber, 
Burton (eds.), Vaults, Mirrors, and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintel-
ligence (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009)
64  As quoted in Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.327
The Evolving Terrorist 
Threat
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Introduction
 In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, 
President George W. Bush’s administration formu-
lated a counterterrorism strategy to curb threats 
posed by nation states as well as by transnational 
terrorist groups.  This strategy was intended to 
prevent state actors from passing weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) to terrorist groups by treating 
terrorist groups as single entities and focusing on 
their potential state allies.  This strategic formu-
lation has largely been embraced by the Obama 
administration.  Yet many major terrorist groups 
such as al-Qaeda are not cohesive organizations.  
Rather, they are composed of many smaller groups, 
each posing different threats and requiring dif-
ferent interventions.  Similarly, there is no single 
nation state threat.  Weak states, hostile states, and 
1 Both auhtors contributed equally
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strong states each pose unique challenges and 
merit distinctly different responses.  The Bush 
administration tended to amalgamate these threats 
under the “either you are with us, or you are with 
the terrorists” rhetoric,2 while the Obama adminis-
tration has demonstrated a better grasp of under-
lying complexities.3    
 The truth is that not all threats require di-
rect military action or other drastic risk mitigation 
measures that impose great financial burden and 
threaten civil liberties.  This paper presents a co-
hesive framework for the United States to address 
the threat of terrorism as it relates to state and 
transnational actors that is grounded in the prin-
ciples of sound risk management and is sensitive 
to particular characteristics of each type of threat.  
First, the paper defines the specific attributes of 
the state threat as well as the transnational threat.  
It then discusses and evaluates the effectiveness of 
the current United States counterterrorism strat-
egy and its unintended consequences.  Lastly, the 
paper defines a novel framework for future en-
gagement of state and transnational actors that is 
firmly based on viable risk management strategies.
Defining the Terrorist Threat
 Al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist actors con-
stitute the primary terrorist threat to the United 
States today both because of their global reach 
and because of their stated intentions to harm the 
2  Bush, George W., “Address to a Joint Session of  Congress 
and the American People,” Office of  the Press Secretary, September 20, 
2011, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releas-
es/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.
3  Obama, Barack, 2010 National Security Strategy, 2010, <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_
strategy.pdf>, pp. 19-22.
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Al-Qaeda’s Elements 
 At the center of Al-Qaeda is its core organi-
zation.  This comprises the central group of leaders 
of the organization, including Ayman al-Zawahiri 
and his close associates.  This group is responsible 
for financing and coordinating high-profile attacks, 
such as the United States embassy bombings in 
Africa in 1998 and the 9/11 attacks in 2001.  The 
core is the element of al-Qaeda that can most eas-
ily marshal the resources, logistical capability, and 
leadership to potentially acquire WMDs and to 
plan high-profile attacks with large amounts of ci-
vilian casualties on United States targets.  Though 
the core is best able to orchestrate the highest pro-
file attacks, it lacks the physical security to do so 
frequently.  The United States-led War on Terror, 
which included military, financial, and intelligence 
campaigns leveraging UN and NATO support in 
the aftermath of 9/11, killed 75 percent of the ini-
tial core leadership in Afghanistan.8  This forced a 
second generation of younger, inexperienced cad-
res to fill critical leadership voids.  Furthermore, 
United States pressure on the core in Afghanistan 
dispersed its members throughout the Middle 
East, Northern Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast 
Asia, thereby diminishing its operational effective-
ness.9  The United States also cut off major sources 
of international funding to al-Qaeda, freezing over 
$130 million of its assets.   These initiatives have 
8  Cronin, Audrey Kurth, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding 
the Decline and Demise of  Terrorist Campaigns, (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
2009), p. 185.
9  Chalk, Peter, Bruce Hoffman, Robert Reville, and Anna-Britt 
Kasupski, “Threats in Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Fu-
ture of  the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act,” p. 14. RAND Corporation, 2005, 
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG393.pdf  
United States.4  Several other terrorist groups pose 
lesser threats to United States interests, includ-
ing the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the 
New People’s Army (NPA), and the Revolution-
ary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  Though 
several of these organizations have international 
reach, they focus mainly on local targets and have 
thus far not sought to create an effective transna-
tional network.5  Thus, this paper will not focus on 
them.  
 Al-Qaeda, however, continues to affirm its 
intent to conduct attacks on the United States, le-
gitimizing violence and unprovoked mass murders 
of United States civilians as an embattled defense 
of the Islamic faith.6  Al-Qaeda is motivated by 
Islamic fundamentalism, an ideology that claims 
to promote the original tenets of Islam.  Al-Qaeda 
interprets those tenets as advocating violence.  
Purportedly responsible only to a divinity whose 
will it claims supports terrorist actions while 
disregarding the common moral considerations 
of Abrahamic religions, al-Qaeda commits signifi-
cantly more extreme acts against non-combatants 
than does any other politically-motivated terror-
ist group.7  As such, al-Qaeda is the focus of this 
paper, though there is room to expand the sug-
gested counterterrorism strategy to deal with other 
terrorist groups as well.
4  Obama, Barack, “Defense Strategic Guidance,” 2012, <http://
www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf>, p. 4.
5  Chalk, Peter, Bruce Hoffman, Robert Reville, and Anna-Britt Ka-
supski, “Threats in Terrorism: Threats to the United States and the Future 
of  the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act,” RAND Corporation, 2005, <http://
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG393.pdf>, p. 11.
6  Obama, Barack, “Defense Strategic Guidance,” p. 1.  
7  Richardson, Louise, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the 
Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2007), p. 68.
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they are rarely able to conduct high-profile at-
tacks.  However, some network actors such as the 
al-Qaeda offshoot, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penin-
sula (AQAP), are more receptive to guidance from 
the core and are more willing to attack the United 
States homeland; these network actors constitute 
the most dangerous aspect of the network threat to 
homeland security.
 Finally, outside of the core and the net-
work lies the periphery.  The periphery is not a 
formal part of al-Qaeda so much as it is an artifact 
of al-Qaeda core’s propaganda, aiming to craft 
the brand “al-Qaeda” as a global resistance move-
ment to mobilize additional support.12 The core 
utilizes the Internet and various social networking 
strategies to spread recruitment propaganda and 
instructions for engaging in al-Qaeda’s style of 
violence.13  These cyberspace resources facilitate 
recruitment and radicalization of peripheral actors. 
The periphery is characterized by its lack of train-
ing and resourcing from the core or the network, 
and its ties to al-Qaeda are largely aspirational.14   
As a result, its attacks are often unsophisticated 
and physical damage is limited.  These individu-
als include those that self-radicalize within the 
United States and other Western nations, a group 
known as “homegrown terrorists.”  In 2009 alone, 
forty-three United States citizens were arrested 
and/or indicted for terrorist activity—more than 
in any previous year—emphasizing the growing 
12  Ibid., p. 168.
13  “A Survey of  Al-Qaeda: Winning or Losing?,” The Econo-
mist, July 17 2008, <http://www.economist.com/node/11701218?story_
id=11701218>.
14  Dickey, Christopher, “A Thousand Points of  Hate,” Newsweek, 
January 11, 2010, pp. 34.
forced the core to rely on less lucrative financing 
methods.10  At present, the core also faces a crisis 
of legitimacy, due in part to the success of U.S 
efforts to counteract al-Qaeda propaganda as well 
as the consistent rejection of al-Qaeda’s violent 
methods by leaders of the Muslim orthodoxy.  This 
combination of factors poses a key challenge for 
the core’s continued survival.
 Beyond the core organization, Al-Qaeda 
has a network, which consists of affiliates of the 
core who vary in how closely they follow the core’s 
guidance.  For many within the network, such as 
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), al-Shabab, and the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), alignment with 
al-Qaeda is a pragmatic rather than ideologi-
cal choice.  Members of the network often align 
themselves with al-Qaeda only to receive financial 
support from the core and the global publicity 
that comes with the linkage.11  Their interest in 
attacking the United States is secondary to their 
common goal of achieving domestic political out-
comes by subverting existing regimes throughout 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia.  Attacks on 
United States interests are designed to galvanize 
local support for the network actor’s local cause, 
and these sorts of attacks rarely occur within the 
United States but are more likely abroad.  For 
example, LeT targeted the Taj and Oberoi hotels in 
Mumbai where Western tourists often stay.  Net-
work actors are generally more limited in their 
popularity, training, and fundraising capability 
than are the core al-Qaeda organization; therefore, 
10  Ibid.
11  Cronin, How Terrorism Ends, p. 168.
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Harakat al-Muqāwamat al-Islāmiyyah (HAMAS), 
which it considers to be a group of “freedom fight-
ers” legitimately representing the interests of the 
Palestinian people.17  Though the goals of rogue 
states are often ideologically opposed to those of 
terrorist organizations seeking safe haven therein, 
pragmatic interests often facilitate a connection 
between these two parties.  While Iran and al-
Qaeda have vastly different religious beliefs—Iran 
is a predominantly Shi’ite state, and al-Qaeda is a 
Sunni group vehemently opposed to other inter-
pretations of Islamic ideology—both oppose Israel 
and the West, thereby fueling a pragmatic connec-
tion.18  Due to the close ties between many such 
rogue states and terrorist organizations, the West 
often treats rogue states in a similar manner to the 
terrorist organizations with whom they collaborate. 
The ability of rogue states to funnel resources and 
WMDs to terrorist organizations poses a grave 
threat that Western nations attempt to curtail, even 
at very high cost.
 Weak states pose a different sort of state 
threat.  Governments of weak states are unable to 
control terrorist operations within their borders, 
resulting in safe havens for core and network ter-
rorist actors.  Examples include Yemen, which is 
unable to stamp out AQAP, Somalia, which can-
not defeat al-Shabab, and Pakistan, which has no 
control over LeT.  Weak states pose a different 
kind of challenge than rogue states because they 
17  “State Sponsors of  Terrorism,” United States Department of  
State, August 5, 2010,  <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.
htm>.
18  Eggen, Dan, and Walter Pincus, “New Links Between Iran, Al 
Qaeda Cited,” pp. 1-2. See footnote 15. 
peripheral threat to homeland security.15  While 
their attacks are relatively low profile, the periph-
ery constitutes the most persistent threat from 
al-Qaeda.  Because these elements are not well 
resourced or well connected, they generally do 
not leave important leads for intelligence and law 
enforcement personnel.  Periphery threats are now 
the most common terrorist threats to the United 
States homeland due to the periphery’s resilience 
and the core’s decline, though these threats are 
also generally the least potent. 
   
Defining the state threat
 
 The second element of the terrorist threat 
comprises state actors that facilitate development 
of malicious transnational actors, either intention-
ally or inadvertently.  Threats from state actors can 
be classified using three broad categories: rouge 
states, weak states, and strong states.  Rogue states 
are openly hostile to the United States and con-
done or actively sponsor terrorist actors.  Salient 
examples include Iran, Syria, and Sudan.  These 
countries often have active ties to terrorists groups. 
Iran, for instance, has well known ties to the Leba-
nese terrorist group Hezbollah and has even aided 
al-Qaeda operatives by facilitating their transit 
to Afghanistan.16  Similarly, Sudan continues to 
support the Palestinian terrorist organization, 
15  Bergen, Peter, and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist 
Threat: A Report of  the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Pre-
paredness Group” [report], Bipartisan Policy Center, September 10, 2010, p. 
5. < http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20
Final%20Threat%20Assessment.pdf>.
16  Eggen, Dan, and Walter Pincus, “New Links Between Iran, Al 
Qaeda Cited,” Washington Post, July 22, 2004, <http://www.washington-
post.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4191-2004Jul21.html>, pp. 1-2.
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Germany, India, and the United Kingdom—most 
of which are also democratic states.  However, 
this category also includes authoritarian regimes 
that are not always friendly to other United States 
policy interests, such as the current governments 
in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.  These authoritarian 
strong states, however, share a strategic interest in 
eliminating terrorist groups within their boundar-
ies. For instance, the Egyptian regime under Hosni 
Mubarak took strong measures to undermine 
groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (a cre-
ation al-Zawahiri, of core al-Qaeda leader), which 
had tried on several occasions to assassinate him, 
and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (an al-Qaeda network 
affiliate).  Now that Mubarak has been deposed, it 
remains to be seen what approach a newly-elected 
government in Egypt will take toward terrorism 
and United States engagement. 
Current Engagement Strategy
Transnational actors
 The United States currently confronts the 
core organization and network actors by eliminat-
ing resource and revenue streams, targeting mili-
tary installations and leaders, and seeing to pro-
mote a positive image of the United States abroad.  
Furthermore, the U.S. has targeted peripheral 
actors through controversial forms of intelligence 
gathering and law enforcement intervention.  
 Confrontation begins at the core organiza-
tion.  Here, the United States makes strong use 
of financial operations.  Specifically, the United 
States and the United Nations have leveraged 
do not actively facilitate terrorists.  They do, how-
ever, often become the nexus for terrorist activity.  
In some cases, these governments may genuinely 
attempt to curtail terrorist activity, but may be un-
able to do so due to limits in their policing power, 
as is the case in Yemen.  In other cases, the govern-
ment is powerless to influence terrorist activity, as 
is the case in Somalia.  Pakistan in particular poses 
a salient threat as a weak state because it possesses 
a dubious capability to secure its own nuclear 
arsenal.19  United States attempts at intervention 
to curtail a terrorist threat are occasionally wel-
comed, as is currently the case with Somalia and 
Yemen.  In other cases, intervention is complicated 
by sovereignty concerns and can delegitimize and 
further weaken vulnerable states.  For example, 
though the United States believes some of al-Qa-
eda’s core leadership resides in the lawless tribal 
areas of Pakistan,20 direct United States military 
intervention in Pakistani territory undermines the 
government’s legitimacy and ability to maintain or-
der.  A broader invasion into this region by United 
States forces could galvanize terrorist activity in 
those states by further radicalizing local support-
ers.  
 Finally, threats can emerge from strong 
states, which are characterized both by their ability 
to limit terrorist activity within their borders and 
by their commitment to doing so.  These states of-
ten include the United States’ closest allies such as 
19  Goldberg, Jeffrey and Marc Ambinder, “The Ally From Hell,” 
The Atlantic, December, 2011, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2011/12/the-ally-from-hell/8730/>.
20  Walsh, James Ingoe, The International Politics of  Intelligence 
Sharing (New York: Columbia UP, 2010), pp. 1-2.
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Laden is an example of decapitation strategy, lever-
aging special operations forces and intelligence 
resources, to target leaders while minimizing col-
lateral damage.
 But force without rhetoric is insufficient.  
Therefore, the final strategy the United States 
applies against the core is counter-narrative strat-
egy, which involves waging a campaign to dispel 
key narratives promulgated by al-Qaeda’s pro-
lific media arm.25 The Obama administration has 
taken positive steps to delegitimize the narrative 
that the United States allows the abuse of Mus-
lims, by signaling a desire to continue a ban on 
waterboarding (an interrogation technique using 
simulated drowning used until 2005) and extraor-
dinary renditions (the transfer of detainees across 
legal jurisdiction for intelligence gathering).  There 
have, admittedly, been mixed results; the United 
States still transfers detainees to other countries, 
though there are stringent safeguards to ensure 
that detainees are not tortured and such rendi-
tions are conducted within legal frameworks.26  
The Obama administration’s choice to end the use 
of charged phrases such as “War on Jihad,” which 
was interpreted as an attack on the Islamic tenet of 
Jihad (peaceful self struggle), counters the narra-
tive that al-Qaeda are defenders of Islam and that 
faithful Muslims should support al-Qaeda.  
25  Leuprecht, Christian, Todd Hataley, Sophia Moskalenko, and 
Clark McCauley, “Winning the Battle But Losing the War? Narrative and 
Counternarrative Strategy,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 3 No 2 (2009), pp. 
1-5.
26  Wang, Marian, “Under Obama Administration, Renditions—and 
Secrecy Around Them—Continue,” ProPublica, September 6, 2011, <http://
www.propublica.org/blog/item/as-rendition-controversy-reemerges-obama-
admin-policies-murky>.
stringent economic sanctions to curtail the core 
al-Qaeda’s funding.21  Sanctions target chari-
ties, companies, and personal assets that aid core 
leadership. Al-Qaeda has lost a significant portion 
of its operational budget as a result of such efforts, 
and sanctions have also made it more difficult for 
al-Qaeda to collect money.22
 The United States also pursues military 
and intelligence operations against the core orga-
nization.  The United States has mobilized broad 
military force in Afghanistan to attack al-Qaeda 
safe-havens, most notably, the core’s organizational 
centers and training camps.  The CIA utilizes a 
sophisticated combination of signals intelligence 
and human intelligence to track and subvert core 
activities.  The United States has also made par-
ticularly extensive use of special operations forces 
and intelligence-operated drone strikes to target 
core al-Qaeda leaders.23  These initiatives reflect 
a prioritization on decapitation strategy—that is, 
degrading the quality of the organization through 
targeted killings of its leaders.  Decapitation initia-
tives are generally targeted towards leaders, aim-
ing to minimize collateral damage.  For example, 
military directives limit the use of air and mortar 
strikes to prevent civilian casualties in Afghanistan 
due to the recognition that civilian casualties lead 
to the potential for further radicalization.24  The 
successful assassination operation of Osama Bin 
21  “UN Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee Overview,” The United Na-
tions, 2010, <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/>.
22  Chalk et al., “Threats in Terrorism,” p. 14. See footnote 9.
23  Bergen, Peter and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Drone War,” New 
America Foundation, June 3, 2009, <http://www.newamerica.net/publica-
tions/articles/2009/drone_war_13672>, pp. 1-3.
24  Ibid.
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 The final threat the United States con-
fronts comes from the periphery.  Counter-
narrative strategies are broadly targeted towards 
individuals at risk of self-radicalizing—the main 
constituency of the periphery.  These strategies 
undermine the justifications that al-Qaeda utilizes 
to recruit members.  Similarly, the United States 
secures important sites to prevent peripheral at-
tacks, because an under resourced peripheral actor 
cannot orchestrate an attack with the sophistica-
tion necessary to attack these newly secured sites.  
Financial and military operations are not relevant 
against peripheral actors given that they leave few 
financial traces and can more easily be intercepted 
by domestic law enforcement.   However, the Bush 
administration utilized intelligence assets to detect 
and counteract peripheral threats.  Namely, the ad-
ministration used data mining (an electronic data 
profiling practice) and a controversial domestic 
wire-tapping regime authorized by the PATRIOT 
Act, amid controversy, to more adeptly intercept 
“homegrown” peripheral threats.
State Actors
 The United States has had a more difficult 
time attempting to form cohesive security policy 
to deal with state actors.  The great diversity and 
breadth of threats that emanate from this cat-
egory makes it a particularly difficult one for any 
country to confront, and the United States in a 
particularly precarious situation given its forward 
deployed military posture and various commit-
ments throughout the world.  The result of these 
 The United States recognizes that there 
is a difference between al-Qaeda’s core and its 
network, but it still utilizes similar methods to 
deal with network actors as it does with the core.  
The Obama Administration has made positive 
developments by acknowledging that the ter-
rorist threat extends beyond Al-Qaeda’s core to 
many network groups that are distinguishable in 
crucial ways.  President Obama explicitly acknowl-
edged in his 2010 National Security Strategy that 
“[al-Qaeda’s] core in Pakistan remains the most 
dangerous component of the larger network, but 
we also face a growing threat from the group’s 
allies worldwide.”27  The Transportation Security 
Administration’s recent decision to outfit airports 
with full body scanners and pat-downs in response 
to network actor Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab’s 
attempt to blow up an airliner with explosives 
smuggled in his underwear on Christmas Day of 
2009 reflects a growing sensitivity to network ac-
tors.  (Abdulmutallab was trained and resourced 
by AQAP, a network affiliate of core al-Qaeda.) 
Still, the United States utilizes similar financial op-
erations to fight network elements, such as LeT, as 
it does with core elements.28  Similarly, it marshals 
military and intelligence resources—using targeted 
killing with drones and special operations forces—
to counteract network actors such as AQAP.29 
27  Obama, Barack, 2010 National Security Strategy, p. 20. See foot-
note 3. 
28  Kellerhals, Merle D., “Treasury Imposes Sanctions on Two 
Pakistan-Based Terror Groups,” America.Gov, November 4, 2010, <http://
www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2010/November/20101104160614elr
em0.4170191.html&distid=ucs>, pp. 1-2.
29  Priest, Dana, “United States Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply 
Involved in Aiding Yemen on Strikes,” Washington Post, January 27, 2010, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/26/
AR2010012604239.html>, pp. 1-2.
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complications has been that the United States has 
responded to individual threats from state actors 
as they have emerged.  Though the Bush adminis-
tration established a very clear dichotomy between 
states that support the United States and states 
that oppose the United States,30 the United States’ 
foreign relations are far more complex and merit 
intensive review and revision as circumstances 
around the world change—particularly in the case 
of dealing with strong state actors.
 When dealing with rogue states, the United 
States and the United Nations have implemented 
crippling financial sanctions on state sponsors of 
terrorism.31  These sanctions have affected Iran 
and Syria particularly harshly but have not shown 
significant promise in accomplishing their policy 
goals.  For example, the European Union recently 
followed the United States’ lead in placing an 
embargo on all oil from Iran in order to halt its 
nuclear ambitions.32  Although rifts between Presi-
dent Ahmadinejad and the Ayatollah Khamenei in 
late 2010 suggest that formerly instituted sanctions 
may be burdening Iran’s political leadership, Iran 
remains determined to pursue nuclear weapons 
at all costs at the time of publication of this article 
and Russia refuses to support further sanctions.  
Similarly, it seems that the threat of sanctions 
has done little good in Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, 
because Russia and China remain determined to 
block any UN Security Council resolution con-
30  Bush, George W., “Address to a Joint Session of  Congress and 
the American People”. See footnote 2. 
31  “UN Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee Overview”. See footnote 21. 
32  “Sanctions and Iran: Beleaguered But Still Unbowed,” The Econ-
omist, January 21, 2012. < http://www.economist.com/node/21543157>
demning al-Assad or instituting sanctions.33
The Bush administration also articulated a will-
ingness to preemptively attack, with full military 
force, rogue states that it suspected of aiding or 
abetting terrorists.  Indeed, the rogue state of Iraq 
under Saddam Hussein was toppled based on the 
presumption (later found to be false) that Saddam 
Hussein possessed WMDs and was working with 
al-Qaeda.  Such preemption, however, has been 
applied in a rather ad hoc manner at times and is 
unsustainable given the amount of resources it re-
quires.  For example, rogue states with purportedly 
similar links to al-Qaeda—namely Iran—have so 
far not been subject to similar preemptive action, 
though this might change in the near future.34 
Weak states require different interventions than 
strong states.  With weak states, the United States’ 
effort should often begin with capacity build-
ing.  The United States provides development 
assistance and aid for weak states that cooperate 
in the fight against terrorist groups.  The United 
States has made extensive use of military-civilian 
hybrid groups called Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRT) to develop roads, water, and electric-
ity throughout Afghanistan and Iraq.  The central 
logic behind these initiatives, as articulated by 
John Brennan, the Deputy National Security Advi-
sor for Counterterrorism and Homeland Secu-
rity, is that providing for the needs of vulnerable 
people in weak states makes them less beholden to 
33  “How to Set Syria Free,” The Economist, February 11, 2012. < 
http://www.economist.com/node/21547243>
34  Eggen, Dan, and Walter Pincus, “ New Links Between Iran, Al 
Qaeda Cited,” pp. 1-3. See footnote 15.
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to the relatively recent threat of “homegrown” ter-
rorists originating in strong states.  It often reacts 
to such threats as they emerge, given the unique 
circumstances involved in each case and the lack 
of previous experience in confronting this danger.  
Here, the United States has primarily employed 
intelligence sharing.  Strong states share a strate-
gic interest in eliminating terrorist threats within 
their borders.  As a result, sharing operational 
intelligence on a terrorist threat within a strong 
state often results in an immediate and effective 
response to the threat.  Yet, the degree of intel-
ligence cooperation has historically varied widely 
based on bilateral cooperation on other foreign 
policy objectives, democratization, and other fac-
tors tangential to strategic interest in countering 
terrorism.37 
 It is important to note that the categoriza-
tions of “strong”, “weak”, and “rogue” states are 
imperfect and do not encapsulate the complexities 
of all countries’ political situations.  The ongo-
ing Arab Spring movement further illustrates this 
complexity.  In reality, many states constantly shift 
between these categories and embody characteris-
tics that cut across different state types.  The wave 
of “Arab Spring” uprisings throughout the Middle 
East has seen Egypt, for example, transition from 
a strong military state with deep ties to the United 
States to one with some rogue features that has 
demonstrated willingness to thwart US interests.38  
37  Walsh, James Ingoe, The International Politics of  Intelligence 
Sharing, p. 17.
38  “Egypt PM: Aid Cutoff  Threats Won’t Deter NGO Case,” 
Voice of  America, February 8, 2012, <http://www.voanews.com/english/
news/middle-east/Egypt-PM-Aid-Cutoff-Threats-Wont-Deter-NGO-
Case-138943249.html>.
the influence of terrorist groups.35  Unfortunately, 
despite the best US intentions, only a fraction of 
this money actually supports development; much 
of the aid is absorbed by corrupt politicians in 
countries like Afghanistan and Yemen. 
The United States has sought to train weak gov-
ernments’ police, intelligence, and military forces 
to conduct operations against terrorists.  In Yemen 
and Somalia, for example, the United States has 
deployed military and intelligence assets to assist 
local governments in fighting terrorism within 
their borders.36  Yet, such initiatives often have the 
detrimental effect of fueling other sectarian con-
flicts and thereby exacerbating the terrorist threat.  
For example, aiding the Pakistani military could 
inadvertently sustain Pakistan’s conflict with India 
and further destabilize the region.  
 In some cases, the United States has also 
sought to share intelligence with weak govern-
ments to encourage government responses to 
indigenous terrorist groups such as in Pakistan.  
However, this strategy is often ineffective, given 
that a weak government does not often have 
the capability to tactfully act on the intelligence 
provided.  In fact, this strategy can even have a 
detrimental impact if there are elements within 
the indigenous government that are sympathetic 
towards the terrorists’ cause. 
While weak states pose serious challenges, the 
United States has faced difficulties in responding 
35  Brennan, John, “A New Approach for Safeguarding Americans,” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC: Federal 
News Service, 2009). < http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-john-brennan-center-strategic-and-international-studies>
36  Priest, Dana, “United States Military Teams,” pp. 1-2. See foot-
note 29. 
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peripheral elements in a similar manner to the 
approach taken to counter core elements are often 
ineffective, strain the budget, and may incur cost 
to civil liberties.  
 The main reason to suspect that these 
strategies may be ineffective is their tendency, in 
some cases, to shift risk rather than eliminate it.  
Al-Qaeda now relies less on centrally coordinated 
core attacks than it does on decentralized network 
and peripheral attacks that, while less potent, ose 
more persistent risks to US interests.  A corollary 
to this changing emphasis is al-Qaeda’s targeting 
of sites of purely civilian importance (e.g., hotels, 
nightclubs, and transportation hubs), or “soft 
targets.”40  Since 9/11 the United States has sought 
to better protect important economic centers, 
military sites, government buildings and diplomat-
ic missions through revised security protocols.41   
Attacking such “hard targets” is a more difficult 
endeavor, particularly for peripheral actors lack-
ing resources.  The major threat has thus shifted 
to “soft targets.”42  Examples include recently 
attempted attacks in 2010 on the Washington DC 
subway system, at the Oregon Christmas tree light-
ing ceremony by peripheral actors, and on hotels 
in Mumbai by network actor LeT.43  Most recently, 
40  Thomas, Pierre, Richard Esposito, Jack Date, and Jack Cloherty, 
“Osama Bin Laden Evidence: Al Qaeda Considered 9/11 Anniversary At-
tack,” ABC News, May 5, 2011, <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/osama-bin-
laden-evidence-al-qaeda-considered-911/story?id=13536789>.
41  Chalk et al., “Threats in Terrorism,” p. 19. See footnote 9.
42  Ibid., p. 19.
43  Temple-Raston, Dina, “Arrest Made In Alleged D.C. Subway 
Bombing Plot,” National Public Radio, October 27, 2010, <http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130863410>; Miner, Colin, Liz 
Robbins, and Erik Eckholm, “F.B.I. Says Oregon Suspect Planned ‘Grand’ 
Attack;” Bajaj, Vikas and J. David Goodman, “3 Bombs Hit Crowded Sites 
in Mumbai,” The New York Times, July 13, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14mumbai.html>.
It remains to be seen how these transformations 
will affect counterterrorism planning and coopera-
tion, but the United States will likely soon have to 
formulate an overarching strategy to respond to 
such transitions.
Unintended Consequences of the 
Current Strategy
 The current counterterrorism framework 
has successfully undermined the most organized 
and potent aspects of al-Qaeda—the core.  The 
relative simplicity of recently attempted attacks, 
such as Mohamed Osman Mohamud’s failed car 
bomb attack at the Portland Christmas lighting 
ceremony in 2010 underscores this point.39  How-
ever, the proliferation of lower profile attacks in 
recent months suggests that the War on Terror may 
have shifted the threat away from the core instead 
of neutralizing the threat altogether.  The United 
States has been less capable of finding an appro-
priate solution to deal with newly empowered net-
work and peripheral actors than it has been with 
fighting the core.  Furthermore, the United States 
lacks a unified strategic framework to deal with 
state actors.  The prevailing perception that all as-
pects of al-Qaeda pose approximately equal threats 
and warrant similar risk mitigation skews United 
States responses toward network and peripheral 
actors, to the detriment of sound threat mitiga-
tion.  Most tellingly, efforts to combat network and 
39  Miner, Colin, Liz Robbins, and Erik Eckholm, “F.B.I. Says 
Oregon Suspect Planned ‘Grand’ Attack,” The New York Times, Novem-
ber 27, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/us/28portland.
html?pagewanted=all>.
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measures.48
         Besides financial considerations, some legal 
experts have raised concerns that Americans may 
be facing significant costs regarding civil liberties.  
To begin with, privacy issues may arise.  Airline 
passengers must go through scanners that cre-
ate images of travelers that resemble fuzzy photo 
negatives or chalk etchings and reveal the person’s 
silhouette, including genitalia outlines.49  The only 
alternative is to have a comprehensive pat down.  
Some critics claim that these policies may be too 
invasive and unnecessary to accomplish the goals 
involved.50  There have also been allegations of hu-
man rights abuses.  In the early days of the War on 
Terror, a new type of rendition emerged that was 
distinct from traditional transfers of people across 
legal jurisdiction (e.g., deportation and extradition) 
in its aim to extract intelligence from detainees.  
Human rights groups have alleged that, in some 
instances, rendered individuals were tortured 
upon transfer.51  Regardless, the United States has 
since implemented protections and safeguards to 
prevent detainees transferred to other countries 
from being tortured.52 
48  Ibid., p. 1.
49  United States Government Accountability Office, “Aviation Secu-
rity: TSA Is Increasing Procurement of  the Advanced Imaging Technology 
” [report], (Washington, D.C., 2010). <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10484t.pdf>
50  Ibid., p. 6.
51  Grey, Stephen, Ghost Plane: The True Story of  the CIA Torture 
Program (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006).
52   “Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policies 
Issues Its Recommendations to the President,” The United States Depart-
ment of  Justice, August 24, 2009, < http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/
August/09-ag-835.html>.
in 2012, a Moroccan individual who mistakenly 
believed that he was working with al-Qaeda was 
arrested for plotting to detonate a bomb in the US 
Capitol.44
 The threat of attack on such “soft targets” 
can generate considerable and unnecessary costs 
that the current administration is seeking to re-
duce.  A pillar of al-Qaeda’s strategy is to provoke 
the United States to increase security levels—at 
great cost—and thereby inflict financial burden 
on the country.  Even unsuccessful attacks are 
deemed victories for al-Qaeda if they cause the 
United States to further increase security and 
incur the accompanying costs.  Al-Qaeda’s strategy 
would indeed seem to be working.  As previously 
mentioned, in reaction to the failed Christmas Day 
bomb plot in 2009, the United States is install-
ing full body scanners at domestic airports at a 
cost of $2.4 billion.45  Such scanners take longer 
to process passengers than standard magnetom-
eters, resulting in longer wait times and burden 
to airlines and passengers.46  The Obama admin-
istration has recently indicated “the Department 
[of Defense] must continue to reduce the “cost of 
doing business.”47  In an age of austerity, an age in 
which defense planners view the nation’s deficit 
as the eminent national security threat, the United 
States must avoid costly and superfluous security 
44  Horwitz, Sari, William Wan, and Del Quentin Wilber, “Federal 
agents arrest Amine El Khalifi; he allegedly planned to bomb Capitol,” The 
Washington Post, February 17, 2012, < http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/federal-agents-arrest-man-who-allegedly-planned-
suicide-bombing-on-us-capitol/2012/02/17/gIQAtYZ7JR_story.html>.
45  Chalk et al., “Threats in Terrorism,” p. 10. See footnote 9. 
46  Rosen, Jeff, “Nude Awakening,” The New Republic, February 4, 
2010, <http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/nude-awakening>.
47  Obama, Barack, “Defense Strategic Guidance,” 2012, <http://
www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf>, p. 7.
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chial strategic objectives.  For example, the Obama 
administration has recently signaled its willingness 
to negotiate with relatively moderate factions of 
the Haqqani Network (a network actor) to reduce 
insurgent activity in Afghanistan.53  Finally, the 
United States should address the growing threat 
from the periphery by further strengthening the 
FBI’s ability to thwart “homegrown terrorism” 
and by working to physically and psychologically 
prepare civilians to withstand the next terrorist at-
tack in a manner that does not impinge heavily on 
fundamental liberties or the budget.
 Starting with the core organization, the 
United States must start with a “divide and con-
quer strategy” to deal with Al-Qaeda’s core leaders. 
Increasingly, Al-Qaeda has been fragmented since 
9/11 by internal strategy and ideological disagree-
ments that lead to in-fighting.54  Counter-narrative 
strategy should focus on intensifying divisions 
among ideological sub-groups within core al-
Qaeda leadership.  For instance, there have previ-
ously been ideological divides within al-Qaeda 
over whether to wage war on Western nations or 
on Muslim countries throughout South Asia and 
the Middle East perceived to embrace Western 
culture.55   The United States should highlight and 
exploit these differences to challenge al-Qaeda’s 
symbolic unity.  The United States should also stop 
referring to loosely allied groups as “al-Qaeda.”  
53  Crawford, Jamie, “Clinton: U.S. Would Negotiate With Taliban 
Leader,” CNN, October 27, 2011, <http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-27/asia/
world_asia_us-afghanistan-pakistan_1_haqqani-taliban-leader-insurgents?_
s=PM:ASIA>.
54  Cronin, Audrey Kurth, “How Terrorism Ends,”  p. 184. See foot-
note 8. 
55  Gerges, Fawaz A., The Far Enemy, (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 
2010), p. 120.
New Strategies
 Risk management and balancing priorities
A new counterterrorism strategy must be firmly 
rooted in the principle of risk management while 
balancing the terrorist threats with other national 
priorities.  To create the proper policy, it is crucial 
to recognize that different threats require dif-
ferent responses.  The level of social and fiscal 
sacrifice undertaken to mitigate a threat should 
also be commensurate with the danger of the 
threat.  Here, we suggest a new counterterrorism 
strategy that is divided into recommendations to 
deal with transnational actors and recommenda-
tions to deal with states.  Within each category, 
recommendations are sub-divided following the 
framework used to describe the terrorist threat.  It 
is not intended for this strategy to be all-inclusive, 
but rather for it to provide a framework for clearly 
identifying, assessing and prioritizing terrorism 
risk, which could be incorporated into a more 
comprehensive approach.
Transnational Actors
 US counterterrorism policies against 
transnational actors must focus on subduing the 
core organization.  By exploiting ideological and 
strategic differences among rival groups and lead-
ers in addition to conducting targeted killings, the 
United States can marginalize the influence of 
the core.  The United States should also approach 
some network actors with less military force, de-
pending on the danger of the actors. It should, for 
instance, remain open to the possibility of using 
diplomacy to engage network actors with paro-
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organization’s efficacy and leadership succession.60  
Therefore, the United States should continue 
targeted killings but limit their use specifically 
to high-risk threats that offer the opportunity to 
simultaneously eliminate large portions of the 
leadership of sections or units as opposed to just 
individuals.
 In dealing with the network, the United 
States should begin limited peace talks.  For 
example, the United States may be able to offer 
resources devoted to education and reintegration 
into society to insurgents that agree to give up 
their arms and permanently renounce violence.  
The United States should not negotiate with al-
Qaeda’s central leadership; however, it should be 
willing to consider the possibility of granting lim-
ited concessions to specific local affiliated network 
groups that offer desirable terms and do not pose 
a danger to the United States.  Discussions of this 
nature should specifically include an “exit strategy” 
to current terrorists that limits punishment, when 
not harmful and expedient, in exchange for coop-
eration.61 
 When confronting the network, it is also 
crucial to be more discerning and prudent in 
funding allocation dedicated to counterterrorism.  
The United States must be careful to not waste 
resources fighting enemies who claim affiliation 
with al-Qaeda but share none of its aims to harm 
the United States.  For example, the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front is a parochial insurgency com-
60  Yoo, John, War by Other Means: an Insider’s Account of  the War 
on Terror (New York: Atlantic Monthly, 2006), p. 57.
61  Cronin, Audrey Kurth, “How Terrorism Ends,” p. 186. See foot-
note 8. 
Doing so overrepresents al-Qaeda’s influence and 
helps al-Qaeda mobilize support.  
 The United States should also be extremely 
careful when targeting killings of key leaders, via 
drone strikes or other special operations meth-
ods.  The United States has significantly increased 
drone strikes against terrorists along the Afghan-
istan-Pakistan border.  Drone strikes have killed 
hundred of militants, including several important 
al-Qaeda leaders.  Yet drone strikes also shift risk, 
as many militants relocate to safer locations in 
Somalia or Yemen.56  Even successful operations 
may result in limited benefits because Zawahiri no 
longer has a “formative impact” on the operational 
integrity of the next generation of al-Qaeda’s lead-
ers in the same way that bin Laden once did.  Per-
ceived assassination may also galvanize their image 
as martyrs or empower more extreme successors.57  
Critics are right to point out that killing al-Qaeda’s 
top leaders will not end al-Qaeda.58  
 These critics also raise complex civil lib-
erties questions, such as the legitimacy of killing 
American citizens that have joined al-Qaeda (e.g., 
Anwar Al-Awlaki) without due process.  Drone 
strikes have also had an estimated 31 percent civil-
ian fatality rate, potentially radicalizing Pakistani 
and Afghan moderates.59  However, past experience 
shows that simultaneously killing many important 
al-Qaeda leaders has devastating effects on the 
56  Bergen, Peter, and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist 
Threat,” p. 21. See footnote 15. 
57  Cronin, Audrey Kurth, “How Terrorism Ends,” p. 179. See foot-
note 8. 
58  Ibid., p. 179.
59  Bergen, Peter and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Drone War,” pp. 
1-2. See footnote 23. 
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the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
and the Department of Homeland Security.  It 
should also integrate state and local governments 
with the federal law enforcement agencies that are 
already congregated in the form of the National 
Joint Terrorism Task Force.
 In domestic operations, the United States 
must be especially careful to protect individu-
als’ privacy.  The United States must thoroughly 
investigate domestic terrorists using only lawful 
channels to avoid: (a) validating jihadists’ claims 
of US government oppressiveness which could 
potentially radicalize Westerners, (b) “chilling ef-
fects” on First Amendment-protected behaviors, (c) 
negative consequences of predictive government 
judgments, and (d) erosion of Americans’ trust in 
institutions.65  The United States should also care-
fully analyze some of its most controversial surveil-
lance programs to evaluate whether their goals can 
be achieved through less invasive measures.  Such 
programs include FBI national security letters 
(subpoena letters for organizations to relinquish 
private records without warrant) and data mining.  
Though the FBI has since limited the use of gag 
orders in national security letters, the FBI, CIA, 
and Department of Defense may still obtain data 
and records about individuals with no probably 
cause or judicial oversight.
 The United States must continue to take a 
proactive approach by using intelligence to assess 
vulnerabilities and increase preparedness; howev-
er, risk management strategy must recognize that it 
65  Solove, Daniel J., “Data Mining and the Security Liberty Debate,” 
University of  Chicago Law Review (2008), p. 359. 
mitted to achieving increased Bangsamoro auton-
omy from the Philippines, yet it has aligned itself 
with al-Qaeda in order to elevate its status.62  Such 
network elements often align themselves with 
al-Qaeda only to elevate their global relevance; 
US engagement fulfills their objectives to lionize 
their own cause.63  Accordingly, the United States 
should be more prudent in its use of military and 
CIA resources dedicated to fighting such actors.
It is also time for the United States to capitalize on 
the network’s mistakes.  By targeting civilians and 
killing Muslims, terrorists have provoked strong 
rebukes from Muslim scholars and former jihad-
ists.64  Polls reveal an increasingly hostile attitude 
both against terrorists themselves and against sui-
cide bombings throughout the Muslim world.  To 
defeat network terrorist actors, the United States 
must highlight their flaws, which include their 
baseless target choice and lack of a positive vision 
of the future, to the Muslim community.
 Finally, the United States must improve its 
security policy dealing with the periphery.  This 
should begin with thwarting domestic terrorism.  
The United States must strengthen the FBI’s Na-
tional Security Branch, which was created in 2005, 
and given responsibility for curtailing the recruit-
ment and radicalization of US residents.   To com-
bat “homegrown terrorism,” the FBI should work 
closely with the National Counterterrorism Center, 
62  Huang, Reko, “In the Spotlight: Moro Islamic Liberation Front,” 
Center for Defense Information, February 15, 2002, <http://www.cdi.org/
terrorism/moro.cfm>.
63  Ibid., p. 184.
64  Bergen, Peter, and Paul Cruickshank, “The Unraveling: Al Qa-
eda’s Revolt Against Bin Laden,” The New Republic, June 11, 2008, p. 17.
Journal on Terrorism & Security Analysis48
is not possible to prevent every attack.  Therefore, 
the United States should incorporate resilience 
and population hardening into its counterterror-
ism posture.  The United States, at times, forms its 
security policies by reacting to attempted attacks.  
Implementing full body scanners, at great fiscal 
and social cost, in response to a peripheral threat 
(as opposed to a true core threat) of the “under-
wear bomber” is one example of such reactionary 
policy.  Jihadists succeed when American overreac-
tions to even unsuccessful terrorist attacks create 
panic-induced political and economic hardship.66  
Consequence prevention strategies decrease the 
harm of terrorist attacks, functioning effectively 
when attacked without warning.  Strategies in-
clude bomb-proofing cargo holds, modifying air-
craft ventilation to reduce chemical or biological 
agent damage, and enhancing emergency response 
preparedness in collaboration with the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and local 
emergency responders.  
 The United States must also psychologi-
cally prepare citizens to withstand attacks.  Though 
politically challenging, the administration should 
continue to refrain from publicly denying all risk 
of attack and begin to teach the public how to 
respond constructively if the United States is at-
tacked.  The government must demonstrate effec-
tive emergency preparedness plans.  The Obama 
administration has done a respectable job of ar-
ticulating the importance of this objective, stating 
in the 2010 National Security Strategy:
66  Bergen, Peter, and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist 
Threat,” p. 1. See footnote 15.
If we respond with fear, we allow violent extrem-
ists to succeed far beyond the initial impact of 
their attacks, or attempted attacks—altering our 
society and enlarging the standing of [al-Qaeda] 
and its terrorist affiliates far beyond its actual 
reach. Similarly, overreacting in a way that creates 
fissures between America and certain regions or 
religions will undercut our leadership and make 
us less safe.67
 Unfortunately, actually carrying out this 
goal has proven far more difficult than simply 
communicating it, and there is still significant 
room for progress to be made.  The benefits are 
so significant, that a stronger effort must be made, 
however, as implementing resilience measures pay 
dividends in terrorist prevention as well; if the im-
pact of a terrorist attack diminishes, terrorists have 
a lower incentive to conduct attacks.68
State Actors
 The United States should establish a 
framework for addressing different types of state 
threats.  The framework must allow the govern-
ment leeway to address different types of states, 
but it also must provide consistency in order to 
avoid accusations of bias and to establish a deter-
rence effect to potential challengers.  Generally, 
the United States should take preventive action 
against rogue states if there is a clear and present 
danger that they might harm the United States.  
Such action could include a military invasion in 
67  Obama, Barack, 2010 National Security Strategy, p. 22. See foot-
note 3. 
68  Jackson, Brian, “Marrying Prevention and Resiliency – Balanc-
ing Approaches to an Uncertain Terrorist Threat,” RAND (2008), p.10. < 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2008/RAND_OP236.pdf>
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more readily and indiscriminately than is prudent.  
Moreover, other countries may follow US prec-
edent and target the United States correspond-
ingly.  The Obama administration should therefore 
publicly acknowledge that, while the United States 
reserves the right to use preventive military ac-
tion, it will be prudent in determining when such 
action is justifiable and will seek congressional 
approval when at all possible.
 In dealing with weak states, on the other 
hand, The United States’ primary strategy should 
be to prevent further radicalization.  The prevail-
ing counter-narrative should continue to advocate 
“a new beginning between the United States and 
Muslims . . . based on mutual interest and mu-
tual respect”70 and to define the threat as “violent 
extremism” as opposed to “radical Islam.”71  The 
United States should promote its image as the 
diverse and accepting country that it has always 
been and will continue to be—the destination 
of over one million immigrants annually.  This 
counters the narrative that al-Qaeda promotes, 
which is that the United States opposes the Islam 
faith and uses military action to specifically target 
Muslim states and civilian populations.  When 
weak governments cannot provide basic services 
like healthcare and education to their populations, 
the United States has done so to prevent civilians 
from turning to terrorists for aid.72  These pro-
70  Obama, Barack, “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning” 
[speech], Office of  the Press Secretary, (Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt: June 
4, 2009).
71  Lynch, Marc, “Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the 
Age of  Obama” [report], (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American 
Security, 2010), p. 3.
72  Brennan, John, “A New Approach for Safeguarding Americans”
the most extreme cases only.  The United States 
should monitor threats from weak states and 
preempt them only if they elevate drastically in 
nature, though a full scale military intervention is 
usually not appropriate.  Instead, the United States 
should prevent radicalization and apply targeted 
methods to prevent associated threats from elevat-
ing.  The United States must also make strong 
states, particularly democracies, its closest allies in 
the War on Terror.  Doing so requires intelligence 
sharing and a combination of cost-effective pre-
vention with risk internalization. 
 To begin with, the United States should 
confront rogue states by making prudent use of 
preventive action.  It is difficult to deter rogue 
state terrorism supporters because they are more 
willing to take risks than most states.  The United 
States requires an aggressive solution to deal with 
these states.  The 2002 National Security Strategy 
declared that the United States would use uni-
lateral force to prevent terrorists from acquiring 
WMDs—the existence of an “imminent threat” 
is not necessary.  Though the United States has 
sought to distance itself from parts of this policy, 
Obama’s continued insistence that “the United 
States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if 
necessary to defend our nation and our interests” 
continues to make threats to the United States’ 
enemies more credible.69  This consequence is de-
sirable; however, the principle of preventive action 
is problematic as currently articulated because the 
United States may bind itself to military action 
69  Obama, Barack, 2010 National Security Strategy, p. 22. See foot-
note 3. 
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 In contrast to dealing with strong states, 
with which the United States has had a long his-
tory of interacting, dealing with transitory states 
poses a more recent and more novel problem that 
requires a delicate response based on developing a 
strong counter-narrative.  United States approach-
es to states in transition require special consid-
eration for counterterrorism planning.  Political 
strongmen such as Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya 
and Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen attempted to 
frame popular demonstrations in the Arab Spring 
uprisings throughout the Middle East as Western-
inspired provocations.  It would seem, for now, 
that popular demonstrations have not included 
demonstrations against the United States—with 
the exception of some growing US resentment in 
Egypt—yet, there is the danger that such a nar-
rative could ultimately proliferate, increasing 
radicalization and support for terrorist organiza-
tions.  The United States should avoid creating the 
perception that it is the driving force behind state 
transitions or domestic unrest and should be espe-
cially watchful of how counterterrorism action may 
be framed as interventionism by political entrepre-
neurs in furtherance of their parochial ends. 
Transnational Actors—State Synergy
 There is perhaps no graver threat to United 
States security than a WMD in the possession of 
a terrorist group.  There are two primary ways in 
which this could occur.  The first is through alli-
ances that form between rogue states and transna-
tional actors—generally established by the political 
leaders of states and the core of terrorist organiza-
tions.  Such an alliance could theoretically en-
grams are essential for preventing radicalization in 
weak states.
 On the other hand, the United States must 
pursue a different campaign in strong states.  To 
begin with, the United States should endeavor to 
stop the spread of terrorist propaganda.  Specifi-
cally in oppressive states, the United States should 
apply diplomatic and political pressure to oblige 
countries that host terrorist propaganda dissemi-
nation networks to force networks to cease those 
operations. 
 Within strong states, the United States 
should also make better use of intelligence gather-
ing and sharing.  Significant barriers to informa-
tion sharing remain within the United States and 
with allies.  The White House’s review concluded 
that the Christmas Day bomb plot could have 
been prevented at an earlier stage with more inte-
grated intelligence.73  Additionally, it is important 
to always allow for the possibility of innovation 
in strong states.  Restrictive immigration and visa 
policies have made it difficult for professionals to 
enter Western nations.  United States restrictions 
on Pentagon research contracts have prevented 
some of the brightest individuals of other nation-
alities from doing state-of-the-art work in critical 
United States security areas.74  The United States 
and other Western nations must establish expedit-
ed visa processes for low-threat, high-importance 
visitors. 
73  Bergen, Peter, and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist 
Threat,” p. 9. See footnote 15. 
74  Friedman, Thomas L., “America’s DNA” [editorial], The 
New York Times, June 1, 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/01/
opinion/01friedman.html>.
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nuclear stockpiles falling into the hands of terror-
ist organizations.
Conclusion
 State actors and transnational organiza-
tions continue to pose unique counterterrorism 
challenges.  The United States’ current counterter-
rorism strategy correctly acknowledges this fact, 
yet does not adequately distinguish between the 
different types of state and transnational threats.  
The framework for a more comprehensive coun-
terterrorism strategy, based around nuanced 
responses to different elements of each threat, is 
presented in this paper.  While the recommenda-
tions presented here are not intended to be com-
prehensive, they provide a first step in grounding 
strategic counterterrorism planning in sound risk 
management principles.  Additional research on 
engagement strategies for each element of the 
transnational and state threat is needed for a more 
complete counterterrorism strategy. 
able a rogue state to deliver a WMD to a terrorist 
organization.  Even if weapons transfer does not 
occur, rogue states allied with terrorist groups seri-
ously threaten global stability by sustaining terror-
ist organizations through funding and through the 
provision of safe haven.  United States counterter-
rorism strategy should therefore place a special 
emphasis on gathering and integrating intelligence 
sources to determine rogue state alliances with 
terrorist organizations and monitoring the acqui-
sition and transfer of weapons.  In some cases, 
military action may be needed to prevent weapons 
transfer to terrorist groups.
 The second way in which terrorists might 
acquire WMDs is by physically taking them from 
an unsecured weak state.  As previously men-
tioned, Pakistan is an example of a weak state that 
possesses nuclear weapons which it may be unable 
to prevent terrorists from obtaining.  The United 
States’ strategy must be to prevent the prolifera-
tion of WMDs to weak states and to secure WMDs 
that weak states already possess.  To prevent 
WMD proliferation, the United States must work 
with its strong state allies and the United Na-
tions Security Council to establish international 
regulations and safeguards similar to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty that extend to other types 
of WMDs and that are more easily enforceable.  
Simultaneously, the United States should expand 
on programs such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 
Threat Reduction program that dedicate financial 
assistance to safeguarding vulnerable weapons and 
nuclear stockpiles in weak states.  These initia-
tives reduce the risk of vulnerable armaments and 
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 Suicide attacks in Pakistan have risen 
sharply since July 2007. Pakistan experiences 
the highest rate of suicide attacks after Iraq and 
Afghanistan.76 The networks and training infra-
structures of suicide bombers in Pakistan pose a 
real security threat not only to Pakistan, but also 
impact its neighbours and beyond. Human bombs 
recruited and trained by Pakistani-Taliban fac-
tions are also sent to Afghanistan to target Ameri-
can and NATO forces stationed in the country. In 
January 2008, a Taliban commander stated on con-
dition of anonymity that the Pakistani Taliban sent 
more than 140 trained suicide assassins to Afghan-
istan between 2006 and 2008.77 The practice soon 
spread to sectarian conflict in Iran where a group 
called Jundullah78 carried out and claimed the 
first ever vehicle-born suicide attack inside Iran 
in December 2008.79 Investigations into the attack 
showed that Jundulla-Iran was either supported or 
at least influenced by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi80 to resort 
to the use of human bombs.81
 The emergence and evolution of suicide 
terrorism in Pakistan indicates that there is an 
abundance of people willing to die in order to 
76  Khuram Iqbal, ‘Drivers of  Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan’, RSIS 
Commentaries, February 27, 2008, www.pvtr.org/pdf/commentaries/
RSIS0212008.pdf, last visited  December 24, 2008. 
77  Abdul Hai Kakar, BBC Urdu, January 10 2008, www.bbc.co.uk/
urdu/story/2008/01/printable/080110_bombers_suicide_rza, last visited 
February 27, 2008. 
78  Jundullah-Iran is a militant organization consisted largely of  
Sunni tribes residing on the Pakista-Iran border. The organization is waging 
an armed struggle for socio-political empowerment of  minority Sunni sect in 
Iran.
79  Nazila Fathi, “Rare Suicide Bombing in Iran Kills 4” New York 
Times, December 29, 2008, at A7. 
80  Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is known to be the deadliest Urban terrorist 
outfit in Pakistan. The group, formed in 1996 to counter increasing influence 
of  Iran-backed Shias in Pakistan, vows to turn the country into a Sunni-
theological state
81  Khuram Iqbal, ‘And Now the Female Bombers’ Weekly Pulse, 
Islamabad,  January 14, 2011., pp. 13. 
Understanding Suicide 
Terrorism
A case study of Pakistan
By Khuram Iqbal 
Introduction 
 The first decade of 21st century witnessed a 
phenomenal increase in religiously and politically 
motivated violence on a global level. International 
intervention in Afghanistan (October 2001)  and 
the invasion of Iraq (March 2003) further aggra-
vated the threat, which continues to spill-over to 
conflict zones in the Middle East, South Asia, and 
other parts of the world. Terrorist outfits are not 
only expanding their outreach but also influenc-
ing each other in many ways. Be it their ideological 
twists or operational tactics, militant organiza-
tions are aptly exchanging ideas and resorting to 
more lethal ways to destabilize the apparatus of 
states. For instance, the tactic of suicide bomb-
ings was unheard of in Pakistan until the arrival of 
Al-Qaeda in the region, and the dissemination of 
its violent/militant ideology helped radicalize the 
predominantly-Pashtun Taliban militants on both 
sides of the Pak-Afghan border.75 Consequently, 
suicide missions became one of the most frequent-
ly used tactics by terrorist groups operating in the 
region. 
75  The first ever suicide attack on the soil of  Pakistan was car-
ried out by Al-Qaeda on  November 25, 1995, at the Egyptian Embassy in 
Islamabad. Similarly, the global terrorist outfit also perpetrated the first ever 
suicide attack in Afghanistan on September 9, 2001, when an Arab assassin 
disguised as a journalist blew himself  up and killed veteran Afghan-Tajik 
leader, Ahmad Shah Masood
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pursue the goals set by their recruiters. What ex-
plains this phenomenon? Numerous studies have 
been conducted thus far to explain the genesis 
and the socio-political and physiological effects of 
suicide terrorism in a systematic manner. In view 
of the existing literature on the subject, the factors 
behind suicide terror may be roughly divided into 
five tenets: (1) nationalism or resistance to occupa-
tion82; (2) Islamist fundamentalism or Salafism83; (3) 
effectiveness;84 (4) absolute or relative deprivation;85 
(5) revenge.86 Unlike the case studies of Palestine, 
Iraq and Sri Lanka, the case of suicide terrorism 
in Pakistan has yet to be systematically studied. 
The above-mentioned hypotheses have yet to be 
tested. The proposed study aims to fill this gap by 
determining if the existing theories sufficiently 
explain the emergence and the evolution of one 
of the most brutal forms of social, political and 
religiously motivated violence—suicide attacks. 
 The study intends to develop a better 
understanding of suicide terrorism in Pakistan 
through empirical research and analysis. A system-
82  Robert A. Pape and James K Feldman Cutting the Fuse: The 
Explosion of  Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop it (Chicago: The 
University of  Chicago Press, 2010) pp. 21-23; Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: 
The Strategic Logic of  Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); 
pp. 44; M Abdel-Khalek Ahmed “Neither Altruistic Suicide, nor Terrorism 
but Martyrdom: A Muslim Perspective” (2004) 8: 1 Archives of  Suicide 
Research pp.  99-113.
83  Scott Atran, “The Moral Logic and Growth of  Suicide Terror-
ism,” The Washington Quarterly 2, (Spring 2006),   pp. 127–147.
84  Riaz Hassan, “Global Rise of  Suicide Terrorism: An Overview”, 
Asian Journal of  Social Sciences 36  (2008),  271-29; LA O’Rourke, “What’s 
Special about Female Suicide Terrorism?”, Security Studies 4 (2009), pp. 681-
718
85  Whereas absolute deprivation refers to longstanding poverty 
and unemployment, Atran defines relative deprivation as a situation when 
converging political, economic, and social trends produce diminishing op-
portunities relative to expectations, thus generating frustrations that radical 
organizations can exploit. See Scott Atran, “Mishandling Suicide Terrorism” 
3, (Summer 2004), The Washington Quarterly pp. 67-90.
86  Anne Speckhard and Khapta Ahkmedova, “The Making of  a 
Martyr: Chechen Suicide Terrorism” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 5 
(2006), pp. 429-492.
atic description of this phenomenon and cross-
testing of the existing hypotheses from other parts 
of the world will contribute in testing or revising 
the existing theories on the causes and preven-
tion of suicide terrorism. The research aims will 
be achieved by conducting an in-depth single-case 
study research on the emergence and the evolu-
tion of suicide terrorism in Pakistan. This process 
will start with the examination of existing theories, 
collecting data that either supports or refutes the 
theories and then determining if further revisions 
are required. In short, the investigation incorpo-
rates two phases: (1) identify the existing variables 
on the subject; (2) testing the variables identified 
by contrasting suicide terrorist campaigns in other 
conflict zones to cases in Pakistan, and; (3) deter-
mining to what extent those variables align with 
suicide attacks in Pakistan.
Working Definition
 For meaningful research, it is imperative 
to define suicide terrorism. What constitutes a 
suicide attack? How are suicide attacks differ-
ent from other forms of attack?  Adam Dolnik, 
Professor of Security Studies at the University of 
Wollongong, Australia, defines suicide attacks as 
“A premeditated act of ideologically or religiously 
motivated violence, in which the success of the 
operation is contingent on self-inflicted death by 
the perpetrator(s) during the attack”87
87  Adam Dolnik, “Die and Let Die: Exploring Links between Sui-
cide Terrorism and Terrorist Use of  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 
Nuclear Weapons”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 17 (2003), pp. 35. 
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 In light of Dolnik’s discussion of problems 
in defining suicide terrorism, a clear distinction 
will be made between acts of suicide in which the 
terrorist killed himself, and those in which the sui-
cide was part of an act of killing others. Therefore, 
cases in which the attacker shot hostages and then 
killed himself88 will not be included. In the case 
of Pakistan, a mixture of civilians and political-
military actors has been targeted by such modus 
operandi. Terms such as “suicide missions” “sui-
cide attacks” “suicide bombings” and “suicide ter-
rorism” will be used interchangeably to describe 
the subject of study.  
 
History of Suicide Terrorism in 
Pakistan
“The method of martyrdom operations is the most 
successful way of inflicting damage against  the 
opponent and the least costly to the mujahideen 
in casualties.”  Ayman Al-Zawahiri(Al-Qaeda’s Top 
Leaders)89 
 Following the US led war on terror, Paki-
stani society witnessed a new wave of social, politi-
cal and religiously motivated violence in the form 
of escalated suicide terrorism. The human bombs  
of various inter-linked terrorist outfits pushed the 
country into mayhem, indiscriminately targeting 
88  Gunaratna describes such incidents as “no-surrender attacks”. See 
for example Rohan Gunaratna, “Global Threat Assessment 2009” RSIS Com-
mentaries, December 30 2008, www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/
RSIS1382008.pdf, last visited May 01, 2011.
89  Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, serialized in Al-Sharq Al-
Awsat (London), December 2–10, 2001, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service, FBIS-NES-2001-1202.
the security forces, political leadership and civil-
ians. 
 Al-Qaeda is the first group to introduce 
suicide bombings in Pakistan in 1995; however, a 
number of Pakistani clerics argue the acts of self-
inflicted killing were introduced in Pakistan long 
before the formation and arrival of Al-Qaeda by 
the Pakistan Army in the 1965 war against India.90 
According to these claims, during the second war 
with India, Field Martial Ayub Khan, also the then 
President of Pakistan,  ordered his soldiers to 
lay in front of the 500 Indian tanks advancing on 
Lahore with anti-tank mines tied to their chests as 
there was no other way of stopping them.91 Refut-
ing such claims, a retired Pakistani officer clarified 
“No soldier was ever ordered by anyone to lay in 
front of any tank with a mine tied to his body. In 
fact, in any army no one can order anyone to die in 
that manner or in any other manner.”92 
 The stories mentioning Pakistani soldiers 
lying in front of the enemy tanks with mines on 
their chests are common in Pakistan and perhaps 
aimed at glorify Pakistani soldiers fighting against 
their arch rival India. According to the Army 
circles, “in the aftermath of Pak-India war in 1965, 
the army was adulated by the nation and all sorts 
of stories real and imaginary extolling its valour 
were doing the rounds.”93 Nonetheless, there is no 
evidence to validate such claims.  
90  ‘Islamic suicide bombings not a recent phenomenon, as once 
thought?’ Jihad Watch, http://www.jihadwatch.org/2008/07/islamic-sui-
cide-bombings-not-a-recent-phenomenon-as-once-thought.html, last visited  
May 03, 2011.
91  Ibid. 
92  Col. Riaz Jafri (Retd), “Suicide Bombings and Islam”, Pak Tri-
bune, July 23, 2008,  www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?20361,  last 
visited  May 03, 2011.
93  Ibid. 
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 The idea that Al-Qaeda was the first group 
to introduce suicide bombings in Pakistan is also 
contested by two Pakistani Counter-Terrorism ex-
perts Zaidi and Rana, who claim that the first ever 
suicide bombing in Pakistan dates back to 1987 
(one year prior to the formation of Al-Qaeda). Ac-
cording to Rana, “The first suicide attack occurred 
in Bajaur Agency of Federally Administrated 
Tribal Areas (FATA) in 1987, when an Afghan jihad 
leader, Sheikh Jameelur Rehman was assassinated 
in his camp in Chamarkand by an Arab Mujahid. 
The Arab assassin, Abdullah Roomi, belonged to 
Gulbadin Hikmatyar’s party Hizb-e-Islami. He did 
also shoot himself at [sic] the spot .”94 There are 
two fundamental problems with this claim. First, 
it does not fulfill the definition of suicide attack 
being used for this study since cases in which the 
attacker shot the target and then killed himself will 
not be considered as suicide attacks. Second, it is 
not clear if Abdullah Roomi, the assassin, killed 
himself after achieving the target or if he was 
killed by the people surrounding Sheikh Jameel-
ur-Rehman at the time of assassination. A former 
Jihadi, who took part in the Afghan Jihad and 
who was also close to Sheikh Jameel-ur-Rehman, 
claimed  that the assassin went to visit Sh. Jameel, 
who had the habit of welcoming Arabs with open 
arms. Sh. Jameel hugged the assassin, who then 
shot the Sheikh many times before he himself was 
killed.95 There are no accounts to determine the 
94  Muhammad Amir Rana, “How the Suicide Attackers Operate in 
Pakistan” (2007) Pakistan Institute of  Peace Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, 
May 04,2007. Online version, http://san-pips.com/download.php?f=pvt0002.
pdf, last visited May 03, 2011
95  Islam Life. Discussion Board on Shaykh Jameel ur Rahman Salafi. 
www.islamlife.com/religion2/forum?func=view&catid=16&id=1844, last 
actual cause of Roomi’s death. 
 In accordance with the definition of suicide 
terrorism in this study, the first ever such attack 
on Pakistani soil was carried out by Al-Qaeda on 
November 25, 1995, when a pickup truck filled 
with explosives rammed into the gate at the Egyp-
tian Embassy in Islamabad, killing 15 people and 
injuring 59 others.96  Various evidences substanti-
ate the involvement of the global terrorist outfit in 
this attack. For instance, the funds for the bomb-
ing operation were raised by Al-Qaeda’s second 
in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, on a fundraising 
trip to the US in 1993, where he was pretending to 
be a doctor for a charity raising money for refu-
gees in Afghanistan.97 Soon after the bombing, the 
Pakistani authorities arrested Ahmed Said Khadr 
on suspicion of involvement in the attack. Khadr 
was one of the founding members and the key 
financer of Al-Qaeda.98 
 Since November 1995, Al-Qaeda, in col-
laboration with Pakistani Jihadi groups, frequently 
use suicide attacks to achieve strategic goals and 
eliminate desired targets in Pakistan. The second 
suicide attack in which Al-Qaeda was directly 
involved took place in December 2003. The attack 
was targeted at Pakistan’s former President, Per-
vez Musharraf, in the garrison city of Rawalpindi. 
Reports claimed that Abu Faraj al-Libbi, the chief 
visited  April 22, 2011
96   McGirk, Tim, “Bomb kills 14 at Egypt’s embassy” The Indepen-
dent,  November 20, 1995, p. A1. 
97   ‘Context of  November 19, 1995: Islamic Jihad Attacks Egyptian 
Embassy in Pakistan’, www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a1119
95embassybombing#a111995embassybombing, last visited  June 28, 2008.  
98  “Al-Qaeda Family: A family divided”, CBC News Online,  March 
03, 2004, www.cbc.ca/news/background/khadr/alqaedafamily2.html, last 
visited June 12, 2008. 
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operational commander of Al-Qaeda, master-
minded and financed the assassination attempt on 
Musharraf. Abu Faraj was deeply connected with 
Al-Qaeda’s North African cells before becoming 
involved in Pakistan. According to Amir Mir, a 
journalist and expert on Al-Qaeda, it was the first 
field operation of Abu Faraj al-Libbi.99
 Until July 2007, suicide attacks were not 
the preferred tactic for militant outfits operating 
in Pakistan. The country witnessed only 16 such 
bombings from 1995 to 2006.100   The military op-
eration against the “Red Mosque” in Islamabad in 
July 2007 radically transformed the threat land-
scape of Pakistan. The hardliner clerics associated 
with Red Mosque had become vociferous critics of 
then President Pervez Musharraf, who joined the 
US led war on terror despite popular opposition. 
The clerics demanded immediate reversal of the 
anti-Taliban and pro-US policies he adopted and 
implementation of Taliban-style Sharia (Islamic 
law) governance in Pakistan. At the core of dispute 
between the government and Red Mosque lied a 
fatwa (religious decree) issued under the supervi-
sion of Maulana Abdul Aziz that declared Mush-
arraf should be killed for his pro-Western policies 
and called military actions against Taliban in the 
tribal areas un-Islamic. 
 The religious decree issued by the Red 
Mosque provided the local and international 
militants much needed religious legitimacy for 
their violence directed at the Pakistani state, its 
99  Amir Mir, “Abu Faraj Al-Libbi’s Arrest A Decisive Blow To Al 
Qaeda”, Cobra Post, www.cobrapost.com/documents/Abufaraj.htm, last 
visited  April 22, 2009.  
100  See Appendix 1 
armed forces and law enforcement agencies, and 
the allied forces in Afghanistan. Such provocative 
action by the Red Mosque was destined to invite 
government reaction. Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, the 
deputy-head cleric at the Red Mosque, admitted 
that the military establishment was infuriated and 
the mosque administration was persuaded and 
pressured by the intelligence agencies to repeal 
the decree.101  Ghazi, who was serving as an as-
sistant secretary in the education department was 
also sacked for provoking the public against the 
government. However, the mosque administration 
was adamant to uphold the fatwa until Musharraf 
government ceased military operations in the 
tribal areas of Pakistan. 
 Meanwhile, Red Mosque administration 
also got involved in anti-government demonstra-
tions demanding the release of individuals picked 
up by the intelligence agencies on suspicion of 
their alleged links with the terrorist outfits. Red 
Mosque clerics were also found involved in the 
first assassination attempt on Gen Pervez Mush-
arraf in December 2003. Pakistani law enforce-
ment agencies termed the breakaway factions of 
Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) as the prime suspects in 
the attack.  It is pertinent to mention here that the 
Red Mosque clergy was pivotal in founding Jaish-
e-Muhammad (JeM), long before the international 
intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. Against this 
backdrop, confrontation between the mosque and 
101  Ghazi Abdul Rasheed “Dehshat Gardi ka Drama, Haqaiq Haazir 
hein” (Fake Charges of  Terrorism and the Real Facts), article was published 
in an Urdu daily in Pakistan and reprinted in an official publications of  
Red Mosque’s publication department. Please see Saeqa Kanwal “Allah Key 
Sipahi” Publications Department, The Students Movement (Red Mosque) 
Islamabad, pp 63. 
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the Musharraf government was inevitable. The 
security agencies declared Red Mosque and its 
adjacent seminaries a security risk and ordered the 
Capital Development Authority (CDA) to demol-
ish them.102 The Red Mosque clerics and students 
vowed to “defend the sacred places till last drop 
of blood”.103 Initially “the movement” was only 
limited to dissuade government from demolishing 
mosques and seminaries in Islamabad. However, 
within a few weeks the students and clerics of Red 
Mosque and its adjacent seminaries started de-
manding the implementation of strict Islamic laws 
throughout the country.104  When “Operation Sun-
rise” (or Operation Silence as it was later termed 
by the media)105 was launched to clear the Red 
Mosque in July 2007, it marked the most unprec-
edented event in the history of Pakistan with far 
reaching consequences. It became the single most 
cataclysmic event that triggered waves of suicide 
bombings across the country and turned Pakistan 
into the security nightmare that it is.  In the year 
2007, apart from ambushes, roadside bomb blasts 
and targeted killings of political leaders, nearly 60 
suicide attacks were reported throughout the year, 
which killed at least 770 people and injured 1574 
others.106 Out of these, 37 suicide attacks specifi-
102  Khuram Iqbal, “Children Library to Enforce Shariah?”, South 
Asia Net, http://san-pips.com/print.php?id=25, last visited March 05, 2011.
103  Umme Ahsan (The Principal of  Jamea Hafsa, a female seminary 
adjacent to Red Mosque), “Saneha Lal Masjid: Hum per kia guzri (The 
tragedy of  Red Mosque: Our sufferings) Lal Masjid Publications, Islamabad,  
October 10, 2007, pp. 13. 
104  Since January 2007, Maulana Abdul Aziz started seeing “sacred 
dreams” — numbering 300 by the time the operation got under way — in 
which according to him, Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) personally ordered 
him to raise the standard of  revolt, declare jihad and implement the sharia on 
his own. See Editorial: Wages of  late action against extremism, Daily Times, 
Lahore, July 05, 2007      
105 
106  Pakistan Security Report 2007, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 
January 2008, Islamabad. 
cally targeted security forces and military installa-
tions. 
 This rise was stark in contrast to 7 suicide 
bombings that were recorded in Pakistan in 2006. 
More surprising is the fact that in the first quarter 
of 2008, Pakistan even surpassed war-torn Iraq 
and insurgency-hit Afghanistan in suicide bomb-
ings. At least 18 suicide attacks rocked the country 
between January 1st and March 1st 2008.107 Most of 
the suicide attacks happened in Pakistan’s volatile 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. In 2009, 
suicide attacks in Pakistan continued to rise un-
abated.108 Although successive military operations 
in FATA destroyed a number of training facilities 
for suicide bombers, the graduates of such training 
camps continued to strike.  
Fig. 1.Chronology of Suicide Attacks in Pakistan
Year No. of Suicide Attacks
1995 1
2002 1
2003 1
2004 5
2005 2
2006 6
2007 60
2008 63
2009 86
2010 68
107  Raza Hamdani, BBC Urdu.com, March 23, 2008, www.bbc.co.uk/
urdu/pakistan/story/2008/03/080323_suicide_attacks_sen.shtml, last 
visited  March 25, 2008. 
108  According to the Pakistan Security Report 2009, published by 
Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 86 suicide attacks struck Pakistan during 
2009. 
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 The year 2010 witnessed 67 suicide attacks 
occurring at a rate of about five per month, with a 
little over half occurring in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(KPK), the province bordering FATA. The tribal re-
gion of FATA was the second most severely affect-
ed region by suicide bombings where 14 attacks 
took place, followed by Punjab with nine suicide 
attacks.  Although still very high, the number of 
suicide attacks in Pakistan in 2010 was lower than 
the previous year (compared to 87 such attacks in 
2009, 68 suicide bombings were reported in 2010). 
In the past, each passing year witnessed a gradual 
and consistent increase in the number of suicide 
attacks and the consequent fatalities in Pakistan 
since 2005. However, 2010 was the first year the 
number of suicide attacks and fatalities in such at-
tacks declined compared to the previous year.109 
 Law enforcement agencies contributed to 
curtailing the number of suicide bombings. Ac-
cording to data collected by the Pak Institute for 
Peace Studies (PIPS), at least 52 would-be suicide 
bombers were apprehended by the police and 
other security agencies across Pakistan in 2010.110 
Out of the 1,187 people killed in suicide attacks 
across Pakistan in 2010, civilians had the highest 
number of fatalities. A total of 1,049 civilians and 
138 personnel of armed forces and law enforce-
ment agencies lost their lives in suicide terrorism. 
Complex suicide attacks involving multiple bomb-
ers increased in Pakistan. Attacks at the shrine of 
Hazrat Ali Hajveri111in Lahore in July, CID centre 
109  “Pakistan Security Report 2010” Pak Institute for Peace Studies 
(PIPS) Islamabad, January 2011.
110  Ibid 
111  A profoundly honoured Sufi in Sunni-Barelwi tradition 
in Karachi in November and the targeting of Shia 
mourners in Karbala Gamay Shah in Lahore in 
September are glaring examples of the use of co-
ordinated suicide attacks by terrorist groups. 
More importantly, for the first time in the history 
of Pakistan, militant outfits used females to carry 
out suicide attacks. Three such attacks were report-
ed in 2010. The first ever suicide attack perpetrated 
by a female struck an Internally Displaced Peoples 
(IDP) camp in Kohat in April that year. The attack 
killed more than 41 people and was attributed to 
Lashkar-e- Jhangvi al-Almi. The outfit reportedly 
carried out another attack using a female bomber 
in Lahore to target a procession of Shia mourn-
ers in September.112 The third suicide attack by a 
female bomber occurred in Bajaur agency in De-
cember 2010. This use of female bombers in three 
such attacks in 2010 raises many important ques-
tions including as how and why have the militants 
opted to use females to launch suicide bombings? 
 The history of suicide terrorism in Pakistan 
demonstrates that the particular tactic emerged 
in the country years after the first such attack hit 
the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut in 1981.Al Dawa (The 
Call), the Iranian-backed Shia group that sought to 
topple Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, claimed 
credit for the attack113  Why has the country be-
come a hunting ground for the Fidayeen114 of vari-
ous terrorist outfits? The following section exam-
112  Khuram Iqbal, “And Now the Female Bombers” Weekly Pulse, 
Islamabad,  January 14, 2011. 
113  Daniel Pipes, “The Scourge of  Suicide Terrorism,” The National 
Interest (Summer 1986). Cited in Adam Dolnik, “Die and Let Die: Exploring 
Links between Suicide Terrorism and Terrorist Use of  Chemical, Biologi-
cal, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 17 
(2003), pp. 35. 
114  A term used by Pakistani Taliban to define suicide bombers 
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ines the existing literature on the emergence and 
evolution of suicide terrorism in other contexts.   
Evolution of Suicide Terrorism 
and Existing Explanations: 
 A plethora of literature exists on the gen-
esis, rationale and evolution of suicide terrorism 
in different conflict-ridden societies. The existing 
literature and theories, however, fall short of suf-
ficiently explaining the emergence, evolution and 
proliferation of this tactic in Pakistan. A review of 
existing literature on suicide terrorist campaigns 
around the world indicates the following five fac-
tors as contributing to the emergence and evolu-
tion of suicide attacks: 1) Nationalism or Resis-
tance to Occupation; 2) Islamist Fundamentalism 
or Salafism; 3) Effectiveness; 4) Absolute or Rela-
tive Deprivation; and 5) Revenge. 
 The first set of literature points to national-
ism or foreign occupation as the root cause of sui-
cide terrorism.115 Robert Pape, the founder and a 
proponent of “nationalist theory of suicide terror-
ism” argues that “every group mounting a suicide 
campaign over the past two decades has had as a 
major objective. . .coercing a foreign state that has 
military forces in what the terrorists see as their 
homeland to take those forces out.”116 In sum, ac-
cording to Pape, “the taproot of suicide terrorism 
is nationalism,” but it is inflamed by intolerance of 
115  Robert A. Pape and James K Feldman, “Cutting the Fuse: The 
explosion of  global suicide terrorism and how to stop it” (Chicago: The 
University of  Chicago Press, 2010), pp. 53; Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: 
The Strategic Logic of  Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), 
pp. 61-63. 
116  Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of  Suicide 
Terrorism, pp. 21 
religious differences.117 Scholars have found an-
ecdotal evidence in the cases of Afghanistan and 
Iraq that substantiate Pape’s claims. For instance, 
in September 2007 a report by the United Na-
tion’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) 
validated that the occupation or the perceived 
occupation of Afghanistan by the foreign forces is 
a primary motivating factor behind suicide attacks. 
The report noted that suicide assailants in Afghan-
istan and their supporters seemed to be mobilized 
by a range of grievances.118 These include a sense 
of occupation, anger over civilian casualties, and 
affronts to their national, family, and a personal 
sense of honor and dignity from counterinsurgen-
cy operations by the allied forces.119 These moti-
vations are all linked to the presence of foreign 
forces. 
 Pape’s earlier explanation was based on 
global data of suicide attacks that occurred in dif-
ferent parts of the world from 1980 to 2003.  In 
2010, Pape, in collaboration with James K Feld-
man, tested his earlier thesis against the data col-
lected since 2004. The data showed a substantial 
growth in the number of suicide terrorist attacks 
since 2004– nearly 500 percent more attacks than 
in all the years from 1980 to 2003 combined.120 The 
authors concluded that there was “strong confir-
mation for the hypothesis that military occupa-
tion is the main factor driving suicide terrorism. 
117  Ibid, pp. 79-80; pp. 88-92
118  UNAMA’s report on Suicide attacks in Afghanistan, September 
2007, http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/UNAMA%20-%20SUI-
CIDE%20ATTACKS%20STUDY%20-%20SEPT%209th%202007.pdf  , last 
visited  December 28, 2008. 
119  Ibid. 
120  Robert A. Pape and James K Feldman, Cutting the Fuse, pp. 10. 
See footnote 8.  
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The stationing of foreign combat forces (ground 
and tactical air force units) on territory that ter-
rorists’ prize accounts for 87 percent of the over 
1,800 suicide terrorist attacks around the world 
since 2004”121. The dramatic rise in suicide attacks 
in Pakistan was also attributed to “the occupation 
of Pakistan’s western tribal region by local combat 
forces allied to American military forces stationed 
across the border in Afghanistan”122 
 It remains to be seen if the groups and 
individuals involved in suicide terrorism in Paki-
stan are motivated by the urge to “liberate” their 
land from the “occupation of Pakistani forces” that 
are perceived as acting on the behest of the U.S. If 
nationalism is the root cause of the emergence and 
rise of suicide missions in the country, which cat-
egory of nationalism explains this phenomenon? 
If it is Pakistani nationalism, what is the role of 
foreign terrorist outfits such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), East Turkistan 
Islamic Movement (ETIM), Libyan Islamic Fighters 
(LIF), Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and a number of 
home-grown terrorists from Western countries in 
the cultivation and continued logistical, ideological 
and financial support of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP), the group responsible for the maximum 
number of suicide attacks in the country? Signifi-
cant numbers of fighters, trainers, financers and 
suicide bombers from Punjab and other parts of 
Pakistan may also undercut “Pakhtoon national-
ism” as the defining factor behind the “sacrificial 
121  Ibid. 
122  Ibid. 
attacks”123 in Pakistan. 
 Pape’s argument is widely contested by 
leading experts in the field of terrorism studies 
including Bruce Hoffman, Mia Bloom, Jeff Good-
win and Scot Atran. The opponents of “nationalist 
theory” of suicide terrorism deduce that identities 
or ideologies other than nationalism can motivate 
suicide terrorism.124 Citing the examples of the use 
of suicide bombings by the Sunni militants in Iraq 
against the Shia and Kurd civilians, and by the 
Al-Qaeda linked bombers hailing from countries 
not-occupied by the U.S, Goodwin asserts that 
“Suicide terrorism, and much non-suicidal terror-
ism, is usually motivated by nationalism that has 
been stoked by foreign military occupations, but 
identities and ideologies other than nationalism 
have also motivated suicide terrorism, including 
anarchism and Islamism.”125 
123  The term commonly used by the militant groups in Pakistan for 
what is generally known today in most parts of  the world as ‘‘suicide at-
tacks’’ is Fidayeen (Sacrificial operations)
124  Jeff  Goodwin, “What Do We Really Know about (Suicide) Ter-
rorism?” Sociological Forum 2 (2006),  pp. 315-330. 
125  Jeff  Goodwin, “What Do We Really Know about (Suicide) Ter-
rorism?”, pp. 329. See footnote 50. 
Fig  2. Area Distribution of Suicide attacks in 
Pakistan (1995–2009)
Area No. of Attacks 
NWFP 114
FATA 30
Punjab 34
Sindh 7
Islamabad 14
Balochistan 7
Azad Kashmir 2
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 Scot Atran also points to Islamist funda-
mentalist ideology commonly known as Salafism 
that is fostering the rapid expansion of this mo-
dus operandi.126 In the case of Pakistan, the influ-
ence of Salafism in promoting suicide terrorism 
may not be ruled out. Multiple suicide bombings 
carried out by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a sectarian 
group that vows to implement Deobandi Shariah 
law (a local version of Salafism that not only op-
poses Shia Islam but also the dominant Barelwi 
school of thought in the country), lay credence to 
Atran’s argument. But the ongoing wave of vio-
lence in Pakistan raises more difficult questions 
about the role of religion in promoting suicide 
terrorism.  For instance, if Islamic fundamental-
ism, with its conception of martyrdom and jihad, 
is the primary driving force behind suicide at-
tacks, why did militant outfits not resort to this 
tactic during the Afghan Jihad when the culture of 
martyrdom and Salafism was injected in Pakistani 
society under state’s patronage? It is not as if the 
Jihadi outfits taking part in the movement against 
Soviet occupation could not have imagined suicide 
terrorism. Hezbollah had already set an example in 
Lebanon in 1983. 
 The idea that religion is a primary source 
of emergence and evolution of suicide terror-
ism has been discarded by a number of scholars 
including Capell and Sahliyeh127, who conclude 
that to understand modern terrorism’s increased 
126  Scott Atran, “The Moral Logic and Growth of  Suicide Terror-
ism” The Washington Quarterly 2 (Spring 2006), p p. 127–147.
127  Matthew B Capell and Emile Sahliyeh, Suicide Terrorism: Is 
Religion the Critical Factor? Security Journal 20 (2007), p. 267-283 cited in 
Ami Pedahzur, “Suicide Terrorism” (Polity Press, 2005)
lethality, one needs to look further than religion as 
a motive and take into account modern terrorists’ 
willingness to use “suicide terror” as their primary 
modus operandi .
 Ami Pedahzur’s “Suicide Terrorism” ex-
plores the history and origins of this trend by 
focusing on the suicide terrorist campaigns led 
by Hezbollah, Palestinian militant outfits, Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Workers Party 
of Kurdistan (PKK) and Al- Qaeda.128 He contends 
that suicide bombings have certainly grown expo-
nentially over the last twenty years. But he makes 
clear, however, that this is not solely an Islamic 
phenomenon but has been utilized with great 
efficacy by various militant groups that subscribe 
to non-religious agenda such as Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Ealem (LTTE)..”Islam is not the factor 
that explains suicide terrorism and treating it as 
such is misleading.129” While discussing the evolu-
tion of this tactic in a particular conflict, Pedahzur 
elucidates that the majority of suicide terrorist 
campaigns were led by a single organization with 
a definite goal and suicide operatives were dis-
patched in order to blow up targets related to the 
goal.130  His argument stumbles when one consid-
ers the current environment in today’s Pakistan, 
where multiple, not single, terrorist outfits with 
varying objectives are employing this tactic on a 
massive scale. 
 Raiz Hassan and Martha Crenshaw at-
tribute the phenomenal spread of suicide bomb-
128  Ami Pedahzur, “Suicide Terrorism” (Polity Press, 2005)
129  Ibid, p. 23 
130  Ibid
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ings to its effectiveness as a tactic.131 Disregarding 
psychological or social factors, Crenshaw con-
tends suicide bombing has been steadily rising 
because terrorists have learned that it is effec-
tive. According to Hassan, “suicide attacks cause 
more deaths, they provide psychological impacts 
- impacts that are further enhanced by the media 
coverage.”132According to Mia Bloom’s theory, sui-
cide bombing only come during the second itera-
tion of conflict, after more conventional means 
have been unable to yield desirable outcomes for 
the insurgents.133
  Jermie Lanche134 found anecdotal evidence 
to substantiate Bloom’s claim. Research by Lanche 
asserts that the Pakistani case of suicide terrorism 
is consistent with the existing theories advocated 
by Pape and Bloom. While applying Pape’s “mili-
tary occupation” thesis on Pakistan, Lanche argues 
that the Jihadi forces using suicide bombings in 
Pakistan perceive their targets (state institutions, 
religious scholars and political leaders) as the 
public face of a foreign power, namely the United 
States.  Hence, according to this author, suicide 
terrorism in Pakistan is largely motivated by the 
perceived occupation or influence of the U.S in 
Pakistan, which is resented by the Islamist groups. 
Anti-Americanism and Jihadi outfits have coex-
isted in Pakistan for decades. However, the country 
131 Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of  Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior 
as a Product of  Choice”, Terrorism and Counter Terrorism 1 (1998) p. 54-64.
132  Riaz Hassan, “Global Rise of  Suicide Terrorism: An Overview” 
Asian Journal of  Social Science 36  (2008), p.  271-29
133  Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of  Suicide Terror (Colum-
bia University Press, 2005),  p. 89. 
134  Jermie Lanche, “Suicide Terrorism in Pakistan: An Assessment” 
Special Report 84, September 2009, Institute of  Peace and Conflict Studies, 
New Dehli, India, Online version www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR84-Jeremie-
Suicideterrorism.pdf.
only became a victim of suicide bombing cam-
paigns after 2002 and the number of such attacks 
skyrocketed specifically in the aftermath of “opera-
tion Sunrise” against the Red Mosque in July 2007. 
Which factors explain the non-existence of suicide 
bombings before 2002? Validating Bloom’s claim, 
Lanche opined that the aftermath of the 2007 
events in Lal Masjid would constitute a second 
stage in the conflict. 
 Bloom’s ‘last resort’ theory is contested by 
Gambetta135 and the trajectory of suicide attacks 
does not support her claim that “non-state actors 
tend to resort to atrocities in the second itera-
tion (or more) of conflict after the other strategies 
have failed to yield the desired results, and when 
faced with a hurting stalemate.”136 The TTP initi-
ated a suicide bombing campaign at the peak of 
its power and popularity. Until 2007, a majority of 
the Pakistanis regarded the group’s actions as a 
legitimate struggle against the American occupa-
tion of Afghanistan, and the Pakistan government 
was deemed an American puppet. Militarily, the 
group maintained a strong control over FATA and 
its adjacent areas. The operation against the Red 
Mosque might be a starting point of the sec-
ond phase of the conflict, but the second part of 
Bloom’s statement (after more conventional means 
have been unable to yield desirable outcomes for 
the insurgents) can be contested in view of the 
significant concessions offered to the militants be-
135  Diego Gambetta Making Sense of  Suicide Missions (Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp. 261. 
136  Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of  Suicide Terror (Colum-
bia University Press, 2005), pp. 89. 
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fore they initiated the suicide bombing campaigns 
against the government. 
 Before 2007, the government allegedly fol-
lowed a policy of appeasing the Pakistani Taliban 
through a number of peace agreements, which 
were widely condemned by the Western media and 
policy makers as “Pakistan giving in to Islamists”. 
These pre-2007 agreements included the Shakai 
Peace Agreement with the Wazir Tribe (South 
Waziristan) in 2004, the Sararogha Agreement 
with the Mehsud Tribe (South Waziristan) in 2005, 
the Peace Accord with the Utmanzai Wazir Tribe 
(North Waziristan) in 2006 and the Wana Agree-
ment in 2007. Nevertheless, despite these conces-
sions to the militant forces in FATA, the conflict 
accelerated and in result the country was set to 
witness the spat of suicide bombings. 
 Gambetta and Hafez attempt to look at 
the phenomenon through the use of detailed case 
studies on one group, or by utilizing a compara-
tive case study, as evident in their works. While 
Hafez focuses on the Palestinian case, Gambetta 
examines  the motivations and morale of suicide 
bombers worldwide, focusing the case studies on 
the Japanese Kamikazes of World War II, Palestin-
ians during the first intifada, and Al-Qaeda in the 
days leading up to September 11, 2001. Although 
studies have been useful to trace macro and micro 
variables behind suicide terrorism, they are limited 
in explaining the case of Pakistan since the social 
and geopolitical contexts of the conflicts are very 
different.
 The element of revenge may also be count-
ed as a major factor in the emergence and rise of 
“Fidayeen attacks” in Pakistan. Investigations by 
law enforcement agencies indicate that the conflict 
zones of FATA and KPK provide an ideal hunt-
ing ground for recruiting potential young suicide 
bombers.137 Mostly, these young bombers are local-
ly hired boys, disgruntled and dismayed over the 
deaths of their loved ones during military opera-
tions. Most of the suicide bombers in Pakistan are 
believed to come from Pashtun-dominated FATA 
and KPK. Since 2003, massive military operations 
launched in FATA by the Pakistani military to evict 
foreign militants resulted in the death of civilians 
and destruction of property.138 Large-scale collater-
al damage during military operations may have ul-
timately resulted in the production of hundreds of 
suicide bombers across FATA and KPK. Pakistan’s 
military operation and the resulted collateral dam-
age is not the only factor behind producing re-
venge-seeking suicide bombers. In fact, US drone 
strikes in FATA and adjacent areas also seem to be 
contributing to turn individuals against the Paki-
stani state and society. As a Taliban member once 
stated, “Our recruiters spend more than 3 months 
to find a potential suicide bomber. But a single 
US drone/missile strike makes the task very easy 
for our recruiters. After each US strike inside our 
tribal areas, numbers of youth seeking revenge for 
the loss of their family relative approach our local 
commanders and register as suicide bombers.”139 
Such claims by militant outfits need to be verified 
137  Interview with an official of  Intelligence Bureau (IB), Islamabad, 
January 6, 2008
138  Ibid. 
139  Aqeel Yousafzai, Journalist associated with Frontier Post, Pesha-
war, July 2008. 
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and examined in a systematic manner. 
 Talal Asad, in his study “On Suicide-
Bombing”, criticizes the existing literature on 
suicide terrorism on the account that it chooses 
to focus on the motivations of suicide-bombers 
(when motivations are, actually, not accessible by 
researchers). The closest attempt to explore the 
causes of suicide attacks in the region has been 
made by Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi who also tends 
to discard individual profiling of suicide bomb-
ers as inadequate and emphasizes organizational 
profiling of suicide bombing as the preferred 
analytical tool.140 “Profiling the organizations in 
strife- ridden countries like Pakistan may reveal 
further fault lines, which could generate valuable 
projections about the future trajectory of suicide 
terrorism as an organizational phenomenon,” Zaidi 
notes. Expanding on Pape’s thesis, he attempts to 
explain why suicide terrorism has gained common 
usage by organizations in Pakistan. According to 
Zaidi, the post 9/11 policy-shift in the Pakistani 
government against the Jihadi forces they previ-
ously supported generated more violent organiza-
tions. It seemed like the moderates had become 
unpopular, and the cadres demanded more ‘af-
firmative’ actions from the leadership, aggravating 
the loop of violence. Thus, a plausible explanation 
for the aggravation of the suicide attacks can be 
the Pakistan Army’s initiated operations in the 
tribal areas.141 Whereas organizations play an im-
portant role in planning, executing and manipulat-
140  Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, “Organizational Profiling of  Suicide 
Terrorism: A Pakistani Case Study” Defence Studies 3 (2009), p. 409—453
141  Ibid. 
ing suicide attacks for their cause, critiques of the 
“organizational approach” maintain that “Rejecting 
individual factors on the basis of a “fundamental 
attribution error” (the tendency to explain behav-
ior in terms of individual personality traits when 
significant situational factors in the larger soci-
ety are at work) can lead to another fundamental 
miscalculation: neglecting traits robustly related to 
particular propensities or temperamental styles.”142 
A systematic understanding of suicide terrorism in 
Pakistan must consider each possible factor, thus 
disregarding individual motivations can impede 
research goals. 
Conclusion 
A Needed Comprehensive Research Study 
 
 In view of the aforementioned studies on 
suicide terrorist campaigns, it can be safely as-
sumed that the case of suicide terrorism in the 
context of Pakistan is yet to be established, as 
there has been a lack of effort made to explore the 
problem in a systematic manner.  Although the 
country remains one of the worst hit by suicide 
bombers, a focus on Pakistan has rarely become a 
topic of empirical or theoretical research on the 
subject.
 A comprehensive research study on the 
patterns of suicide terrorism in Pakistan must take 
142  Adolf  Tobena from Unit of  Medical Psychology, Department 
of  Psychiatry and Forensic Medicine, Autonomous University of  Barcelona, 
raised this important point in a letter to the editor of  “Science”. Pls see Let-
ters to Editor ‘Individual Factors in Suicide Terrorism” Science, Volume 304, 
April 4, 2004
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into account the extent to which existing theories 
on suicide terrorism explain the emergence and 
evolution of this tactic in Pakistan. Why did the Is-
lamist militant outfits refrain from suicide attacks 
during the Afghan Jihad? What are the profiles of 
militant groups using suicide bombings in Paki-
stan? What is the average profile of the Pakistani 
suicide bombers?  Why has the country witnessed 
an unparalleled increase in such attacks specifi-
cally after “Operation Sunrise” against the Red 
Mosque in July 2007? Why have the Baloch na-
tionalist and Shia sectarian militant groups not yet 
resorted to this tactic, despite years of resistance 
against the central government and the Sunni 
militants? 
 To date, the aforementioned critical ques-
tions have attracted little systematic research, 
which will contribute in strengthening, rejecting, 
or revising the existing theories on the genesis 
and prevention of suicide terrorism. Apart from 
filling this academic gap and adding strength to 
already existing literature on suicide terrorism, the 
outcome of this study will also contribute in the 
realm of policy making by providing a systematic 
understanding of the threat. This will ultimately 
help in identifying the steps needed to counter 
suicide attacks on an operational and ideological 
level 
Book Review
Understanding 
Al Qaeda
Changing War and Global Politics 
By Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedouy
Review by Tom Smith
 Yes, another book on Al Qaeda, but accord-
ing to the blurb, this one “controversially argues 
that Al Qaeda has clear aims, and the only way to 
defeat it is to engage with its `arguments in a seri-
ous way”.  And that’s an awfully bold and slightly 
odd statement of intent for which I think the book 
can be fairly and critically judged.
 Many have fallen foul of the numerous 
pitfalls in writing on AQ and so reading any new 
‘interpretation’ carries baggage that the reader and 
author should well appreciate. With the best new 
works adding to the minority of well researched, 
conceptualised and thought provoking, while the 
likes of Paul Williams and his 9/11 reactionary, “Al 
Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror,” and alike, continue 
to mislead and engender dangerous ideas about 
AQs realities and more importantly its meaning. 
This trend is certainly not limited to academic 
writings; indeed some of the more biased and in-
flammatory work (and I would argue most danger-
ous) has come from policy publications and state 
apparatuses under pressure for political slogans 
and hard targets for the evening news. 
 This new addition to landscape has a dif-
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 While the deduction is accurate, I am not 
sure that it is surprisingly ignored. In fact, there is 
good reason to ignore that difficult question.   
 Who, for one, would know why AQ acts? 
Isn’t it much more natural to cry havoc and let slip 
the dogs of war rather than ‘get inside the head 
of those evil terrorists?’ If Mohamedou has been 
surprised by the reluctance of the mainstream 
and academe to pursue this question than one 
has to ask about his grounding in the debate as a 
whole. Asking why is certainly the most important 
question in the field, though figuring out how 
that question can and should be answered is not 
brought any closer into view through this work.
 Mohamedou asserts that AQ is an organisa-
tion, an entity, capable of a casus belli without ever 
convincing us of how or what led him to that con-
clusion. Any author describing AQ as a cohesive 
body capable of control and rationale must surely 
defend this assertion, for the mounting evidence 
to the contrary. He uses the well-quoted words 
of Osama Bin Laden and there are some neatly 
drawn diagrams of the organisational structure 
of AQ through the years, but this is not evidence, 
and the attempt to extrapolate a meaning from it is 
problematic. In essence, Mohamedou risks being 
culpable of the same mistake many others make 
by believing the AQ myth and buying into the AQ 
brand before ascertaining any reality. This book 
does not rely on any primary research, nor does 
the author exhibit any unique access to AQ, which 
would support his assertion of AQ as an organisa-
tion worthy of analysis in this manner.
ficult act to follow, to emulate, outdo and engage 
with the like of Jason Burke, Faisal Devji, Scott 
Atran, and Fawaz Gerges is certainly no mean feat. 
But it is in that landscape that this work must be 
judged. Especially so when the author outlines his 
premise:
“This is a work of political science which 
weighs social underpinnings of political vio-
lence and borrows from the legal discipline 
to make a statement relevant to policy-making 
meant to address terrorism. It provides an argu-
ment about the necessary sober examination of 
Al Qaeda’s casus belli.”
 Mohamedou opens with a chapter dedicat-
ed to what he sees as AQ’s casus belli (or justifica-
tion for war).  An excellent decision as this area of 
understanding is often ignored and more in-depth 
comment and research is desperately needed. So, 
it is with deep disappointment then, that the work 
falls short on this stated goal.
 This failure is not down to any one central 
issue of methodology, political bias or understand-
ing as has been in the case in other works, but an 
appreciation of the debates and other works in 
the field which say more than the author manages 
here, ask more interesting questions and vitally do 
so in a more fluid and illuminating style.
 For instance, in the introduction, an alarm 
bell rings when Mohamedou notes:
“It is particularly surprising that policy-mak-
ers and academe chose to ignore reasons for 
which a party is going to war…”
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put forward by Devji, are unfortunately also miss-
ing from this book. 
 Scott Attran’s “Talking to the Enemy” and 
Ariel Merari’s “Driven to Death” have attempted 
(granted with only limited success but their con-
tribution should not be underestimated) to the 
question of why AQ exists and actually conducted 
some research. I mention these works because of 
their solid commitments to widen the scope of in-
quiry beyond the AQ examination to include those 
often labelled as militants, jihadis, suicide bombers 
and terrorists without classifying them simply as 
members of Al Qaeda, a single body for which no 
one controls or speaks for but yet for whom we are 
supposed to believe has a meaning and justifica-
tion – stated or inferred 
 Instead, the work runs down tangents, 
which semi-interesting it does not contend with 
the books own stated goal and aim. The author 
goes through the motions in mentioning a number 
of authors in areas he is obviously interested in, 
like Political Philosophy, Paul Gilbert in a short 
paragraph on just war theory and Mary Kaldor and 
the New Wars distinction are given a cursory and 
respectful citation. But there is no in-depth en-
gagement with their material and his stated aims. 
 Any author with the aim of examining AQs 
justification for war should not impose a justifi-
cation made from secondary sources that lack a 
proven basis. Nor should a philosophical question 
about AQs motives only be the preserve of ivory 
tower dwelling thinkers, somewhere in the middle 
of both problems lies this work, which is not to say 
it does not contain some accurate interpretations 
of the current situation and does provide an inter-
esting collage of other writings connected to AQ. 
 However, when Mohamedou overlooks the 
fact that half a decade earlier he was beaten to the 
task of highlighting this question of AQs meaning 
and Justification by Faisal Devji in “Landscapes of 
the Jihad,” who I would argue brought more to the 
table then, its hard to commend this over Devjis 
work. 
 While Devji certainly set a high watermark 
for thinking in this area, few writers have attempt-
ed to engage with the ideas since and this work 
doesn’t reverse that trend. Those that have done 
so, and have pursued primary sourced research 
while taking on board the conceptual progression 
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